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The role of on- and off-balance-sheet leverage of banks in 
the late 2000s crisis 
 
 
 
Abstract  
Extensive regulatory changes and technological advances have transformed banking 
systems to a great extent. Banks have reacted to the challenges posed by the new 
operating environment by creating new products and expanding their activities to 
some uncharted business areas. In this paper, we study how modern banking which 
gave birth to the off-balance-sheet leverage activities affected the risk profile of U.S. 
banks as well as the level of systemic risk before and after the onset of the late 2000s 
financial crisis. Towards this, we separate on- from off-balance-sheet leverage and 
capture the latter with different, yet complementary, measures which do not exist in 
the current literature. Special attention is paid on the deleveraging process that 
occurred in the banking market after the crisis erupted, which is an additional 
innovative feature of this study. Our findings reveal that leverage, both explicit and 
hidden off-the-balance-sheet, increases the individual risk of banking firms making 
them vulnerable to financial shocks. Reverse leverage, on the other hand, is beneficial 
for individual banks’ health, but is found to be harmful for financial stability. We also 
demonstrate that the banks which concentrate on traditional lines of business typically 
carry less risk compared to those involved with modern financial instruments. 
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1. Introduction 
     The late 2000s financial crisis, whose origins can be traced in the rising delinquencies in the 
U.S. subprime mortgage market in 2006 and the succeeding collapse in housing prices in August 
2007, has revealed several inadequacies in the functioning of the financial system: loose 
monetary policies, performance-based remuneration practices, and inefficient regulatory and 
supervisory rules in the years preceding the crisis are amongst the perceived causes of making 
the entire system more vulnerable to shocks. A factor which is related to the aforementioned 
shortfalls and is identified in the current crisis literature as having a substantial role in the 
buildup of severe structural weaknesses and adverse market dynamics during the pre-crisis 
period is the high leverage of financial institutions worldwide. 
     In general terms, leverage is viewed as one of the main underlying features of banks’ balance 
sheets. Traditionally, leverage arises directly through formal debt where the most popular types 
of debt are bonds and credit lines. Nevertheless, in the years before the crisis, banking firms were 
deemed to have leveraged their positions to a much greater extent than they used to by taking 
advantage of financial engineering techniques, which allowed them to transfer a large part of 
their leverage off their balance sheets.1 Therefore, a significant degree of leverage was assumed 
implicitly, in the sense that it was not recorded on the balance sheet of banks. However, shortly 
after the crisis erupted, financial organisations sought to deleverage their positions thus 
amplifying the already existing downward pressure on asset prices which, in turn, encouraged 
the deleveraging spiral even further. This procyclical process was exacerbated by the large size 
and the systemic importance of the financial institutions that were engaged in the off-balance-
sheet activities. Overall, the malfunctions of the banking industry strongly affected the rest of the 
financial system resulting in a massive contraction of liquidity and credit availability which, 
shortly later, exerted a serious adverse influence on the real economy. 
     Even though the impact of leverage on the health of the financial system has been discussed 
in several policy and academic studies (see, e.g., CRMP Report, 2008; Greenlaw et al., 2008), 
not enough empirical evidence has been gathered to provide definite answers about the relevance 
of leveraging and the role of deleveraging in the propagation and prolongation of the latest 
financial crisis. Along these lines, little attention has been paid to the overall leverage behaviour 
                                                 
1
 It is true that the corporate financial sector was also engaged in high-leverage business projects before the onset of 
the crisis. However, this issue is out of the scope of the current study. 
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of banks in the sense that the extant literature mainly focuses on the traditional on-balance-sheet 
leverage, neglecting, to a great extent, the importance of the implicit leverage in the operation 
and the soundness of the banking system. In this paper, we make an attempt to fill part of this 
void by empirically assessing how modern banking, which gave birth to the off-balance-sheet 
leverage, has affected the health of the U.S. systemically important banking companies as well as 
the level of risk of the entire U.S. banking system before and after the onset of the late 2000s 
crisis. To this aim, we separate on- from off-balance-sheet leverage activities and capture the 
latter set of activities with different, yet complementary, measures which do not exist in the 
current literature. Importantly, we devote special attention to the deleveraging process which 
took place in the banking market after the crisis erupted. 
     Our findings reveal, among other things, that on-balance-sheet leverage has a negative impact 
on the health of individual banks as well as on the stability of the system. By the same token, we 
find that the different types of off-balance-sheet leverage are negatively linked to the soundness 
of the banking system as a whole. This result is even stronger in case systemic risk is considered. 
Reverse leverage, on the other hand, has beneficial effects on individual banks’ health, but 
increases the fragility of the entire system. We also demonstrate that the banks that concentrate 
on the traditional activity of taking deposits from households and making loans to agents who 
require capital carry less risk to the system compared to banks which are involved with new 
financial services. On the whole, our results provide a better understanding of one of the root 
causes of the global financial crisis and contribute to the discussion on the restructuring and 
strengthening of the existing regulatory framework for banks. 
     The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we examine how on- and off-
balance-sheet leverage as well as reverse leverage are linked to the soundness of individual 
banks and to the health of the banking system; both an empirical and a theoretical approach are 
taken to illustrate the aforementioned relationships. Section 3 provides a description of the data 
set and a justification of the variables used in our baseline empirical analysis; the regression 
model, together with the descriptive statistics and the estimation methodology are also presented 
in this section. Section 4 then reports and discusses the empirical results, which are subjected to 
robustness checks in Section 5. The policy implications of our findings along with the 
concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. 
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2. The nexus between leverage, reverse leverage and risk in the banking system 
2.1. An empirical perspective 
     Generally speaking, bank leverage refers to the use of debt in financing new assets and 
investments. Regarding the on-balance-sheet leverage of banks, this is related to the use of 
deposited funds or any other balance sheet items like, for instance, bonds to supplement banks’ 
equity capital in financing fresh loans and investments. Banks expect that the granted loans will 
produce a higher rate of return compared to the interest rate that they have agreed to pay to their 
depositors (or, investors in the case of bonds). If the loan/investment return rates turn out to be 
lower than anticipated, the bank’s equity capital (or net worth) will inevitably shrink since the 
bank will have to cover the difference between deposit and lending rates by resorting to its equity 
capital. Further, if we presume that a loan fails to perform and that the bank is not able to recover 
it, the loan will be charged off, implying that the institution will lose an amount of assets equal to 
the loan loss. Charge-offs will have an impact on the liabilities side of the bank’s balance sheet 
as they will reduce the bank’s net worth by the amount of the loss. Overall, equity is viewed as a 
buffer against the losses a bank suffers in case loans -or other bank investments- go sour. 
Apparently, if several -let alone many- borrowers default on their obligations, then the equity 
capital will be in peril. Should nonperforming and defaulted loans accumulate, which is a 
common phenomenon in bad economic times, equity capital would disappear. In sum, on-
balance-sheet leverage maps the riskiness of a bank’s asset position into the riskiness of its 
equity stake.   
     Leverage can also be traced off the balance sheet of banking organisations. Specifically, in 
the years running up to the crisis, banks have been transferring a part of their leverage and the 
accompanying risk off their balance sheets mainly through their engagement in securitisation 
activities and Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives trading. Both these undertakings are strongly 
linked to the so-called ‘regulatory arbitrage’. This sort of arbitrage refers to the response of banks 
to regulatory restrictions (especially those on capital requirements) that were imposed by Basel I 
and II. In more details, regulatory arbitrage is the game that takes place between banking firms 
and regulatory authorities, whereby the former innovate and develop new financial instruments 
in order to elude the scrutiny of supervisors and increase their returns, and the latter tighten the 
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 5
rules to avoid excessive risk-taking with the utmost purpose to safeguard the stability of the 
financial system.2 
     Securitisation was mainly achieved through the setup of Asset Backed Commercial Paper 
(ABCP) conduits and Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) where banks could transfer large 
portions of their assets. More concretely, a considerable amount of bank assets was transferred to 
the above-mentioned investment pools, whilst, at the same time, the sponsoring banking 
institutions were providing these pools with liquidity and credit enhancements (or backstops) in 
order to ensure funding liquidity for them. Those backstops could attract a low charge under 
Basel Agreements and were funded mostly by short-term securitised debt and only by very little 
equity capital -or any other long-term investments- which has been always costly for banks. In so 
doing, the sponsoring institutions were able to free up capital and, hence, originate more assets -
generally of lower quality (like, e.g., subprime mortgage loans)- that were typically hidden in the 
so-called shadow banking system.3 Therefore, banks deliberately avoided issuing new equity 
capital in order to originate new assets and, more generally, to finance their activities.4 As a 
consequence, conduits and SIVs contained a significant degree of bank leverage and risk in an 
implicit form that was achieved through the structuring of the financial instruments per se. 
Nonetheless, under the aforementioned business scheme of funding which had come to be known 
as the ‘originate-to-distribute model’, investors in conduits and SIVs would return the assets 
back to the originating bank once they suffered a loss; and banks were, indeed, legally obliged to 
take bad assets back on their books. This is to say, asset risk was still burdened the sponsoring 
institutions. 
     Derivative products, on th  other hand, grew up as part of an effort to better manage the 
investment risks amongst international market participants. In specific, derivatives trading 
facilitated capital flows worldwide by unbundling and more efficiently reallocating the various 
sources of risk which were associated with traditional banking products such as bank loans, 
bonds, and securities. Hence, the financial innovation of introducing derivatives to capital 
                                                 
2
 For a thorough discussion of regulatory capital arbitrage through derivative instruments, see Breuer (2002). 
3
 Shadow banking consisted of non-bank financial institutions like hedge funds, insurance funds, investment funds, 
pension funds, SIVs, conduits, to name the most important ones. Some of these institutions, like SIVs and conduits, 
are not in operation anymore. 
4
 Banks were very keen on engaging in securitised activities not only because they could qualify for lower capital 
requirements, but also because securitisation had the extra advantage of generating fee income. Fees did not have to 
be returned in case securities suffer losses thus providing banks with an additional incentive to structure products 
and leverage their positions even further.  
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markets allowed the rather traditional arrangements of risk to be redesigned in order to better 
meet the desired risk profiles of the issuers and holders of these instruments. To put it differently, 
through the use of derivatives, a part of risk is taken away from investors who are not willing to 
undertake it and move towards those who are more risk-lovers and thus more willing and 
(probably) more able to bear it. 
     While the risk-shifting function of derivatives can play the useful role of hedging and thereby 
facilitating capital flows, derivatives can at the same time create new risks for the health of 
banking institutions and for the soundness of the system. The extensive use of derivative 
contracts is likely to lead to a lower degree of transparency between counterparties and also 
between regulators and market investors which can potentially harm the stability of the financial 
system. This holds true especially for derivative products which are traded over-the-counter and 
are directly related to the off-balance-sheet leverage exposure of banking enterprises. Indeed, 
derivatives are traded in two main ways: either on exchanges, where trading is public and can be 
regulated by governments while observed and controlled by market participants, or in the OTC 
markets where trading is non-public and remains outside authorities’ supervision and regulation. 
That is, unlike derivatives trading on stock exchanges, transactions in the OTC markets are 
neither registered nor systematically reported to the public and, as such, comprehensive 
information on them is limited. 
     In addition, derivatives can be utilised for non-productive purposes such as avoiding capital 
adequacy requirements (what has been already mentioned as ‘regulatory arbitrage’), evading 
taxation, manipulating accounting figures, and misleading credit rating agencies. For instance, 
derivative products can be us d to raise the level of market risk exposure relative to the bank 
capital in the pursuit of banks for higher-yielding investment opportunities. In case of an 
unexpected or a sharp change in the exchange rate or any other market prices, the larger the 
amount of market exposure -most likely created by open positions in derivatives contracts-, the 
greater will be the effect on the asset portfolio of individual banks and, hence, on the banking 
sector as a whole. In this regard, the use of derivatives to reduce the amount of capital which acts 
as a cushion to market turmoil raises the risk of bank failure and heightens doubts about the 
soundness of the entire sector. 
     As is apparent from the discussion so far, leverage, either on- or off-the-balance-sheet of 
banks, can be potentially harmful for the stability of the financial system. Equally, if not more 
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harmful than leverage itself is the so-called ‘reverse leverage’, or ‘deleveraging’, which refers to 
the phenomenon in which financial intermediaries all attempt to shrink their balance sheets 
together by selling part of their assets or by reducing their debt with the chief purpose to return to 
a safe level of capital. When a significant number of banks attempt to deleverage their balance 
sheets with the aim to strengthen their leverage ratios, various destabilising factors can be set in 
motion. If, for instance, several institutions attempt to sell part of their assets at the same time, 
the market prices of these assets will almost immediately fall, especially in the case that the 
selling assets are of the same class (e.g., mortgage loans, housing assets, etc.). Asset prices will 
then decline to the point where the sale proceeds will not retire enough debt to improve leverage 
ratios. In fact, ratios may actually deteriorate. Banks will, in turn, hold off selling as long as 
possible and the market will freeze up. As a consequence, a large volume of hard-to-value assets 
carried by highly leveraged institutions is looming over the markets. Overall, any serious fall in 
asset prices, or any large losses in loans or securities, or any cut in cash flows can exert reverse 
leverage effects on the system. Arguably, the deleveraging process puts additional downward 
pressure on financial markets, especially in a system that consists of highly leveraged banks. 
 
2.2. A theoretical perspective 
     In a theoretical analysis of the causes of the late 2000s crisis, Brunnermeier (2009) focuses on 
the U.S. banking industry to claim that the traditional relationship business model, in which 
banks issue loans and hold them until they are repaid, has been replaced by a new model. Under 
this new model, financial engineering techniques help banks to pool the loans, slice them into 
tranches, and sold them to both primary and secondary markets via securitisation. This 
transformation has, on the one hand, weakened the ability of banks to monitor the incentives of 
the agencies involved in this ‘originate-to-distribute-process’ while, on the other, it has increased 
the possibility for investors of holding a large amount of securities without fully understanding 
the associated risk. 
     Van Oordt (2013) makes an attempt to shed more light on the dark side of diversification. He 
constructs a theoretical model to show that tranching plays an important role for the economy 
from both microprudential and macroprudential perspectives. Regarding the former perspective, 
tranching is found to promote a fall in the likelihood of individual failures beyond the minimum 
level that could be achieved by linear diversification policies. This latter kind of policies is 
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referred to the diversification of asset holdings by the construction of linear combinations of loan 
portfolios. In fact, Wagner (2010), again in a theoretical modelling context, illustrates how linear 
diversification can lead to an upsurge in the probability of joint failures amongst financial 
institutions and, hence, to an increase in the level of systemic risk. Turning to the 
macroprudential view, Van Oordt (2013) proves that tranching offers the opportunity to banks to 
adopt diversification strategies which are non-linear, and that these non-linearities can reduce the 
bankruptcy risk of individual institutions beyond the minimum level attainable by linear 
diversification. Importantly, these non-linear diversification policies are not found to increase 
systemic risk. 
     Kiff and Kisser (2013) investigate the economics of securitisation comparing the results of 
equity and mezzanine tranche retention in the context of systemic risk, moral hazard, accounting 
frictions and funding distortions. They show that loan screening activity is maximised via the 
maximisation of due diligence when the bank which originates the loan retains the equity 
tranche. Moving further into the heart of securitisation puzzle, they evaluate the relevance of 
market frictions in their conclusions testing whether equity or mezzanine tranche retention 
maximises the profits of banks. They document that, in case capital structure irrelevance does not 
hold and the costs of debt and equity are very high, mezzanine tranche retention is more likely to 
help banks maximising their profits. 
     Regarding the derivatives trading activity of banks, Fabozzi and Choudhry (2004) argue that 
the use of credit derivatives allow banks to increase the use of scarce capital by means of risk 
mitigation where, at the same time, help them to improve their management of regulatory capital. 
Duffee and Zhou (2001) and Morrison (2005) develop two theoretical models which demonstrate 
how credit derivatives markets can reduce economic welfare. They show that credit risk transfer 
can lead to a decline in welfare through contagious effects that can harm the stability of the 
entire system. More specifically, Morrison illustrates that credit derivatives can destroy the 
signaling value of debt and this may cause disintermediation and welfare reduction. 
     Turning to reverse leverage which typically takes place during economic downturns, Cornett 
et al. (2011) demonstrate that the pressure for banking firms to deleverage after the onset of the 
crisis was exacerbated by the fact that they had to honour prior commitments to credit lines 
which were mainly nominated in U.S. dollars. They further show that the sharp decrease in 
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leverage is due to the need of banks to dump off risky assets. The impressive extent to which 
financial institutions deleveraged during the crisis is also discussed in Adrian and Shin (2010). 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Description of the data set 
     Our empirical analysis is based on a data set that consists of 20 U.S. banks as reported in the 
Table 1 that follows. These banks are of the same institution type as they are all defined as 
‘Domestic U.S. Financial Holding Companies’ by the National Information Center of the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (NIC/FFIEC). The sample institutions have been 
selected primarily on the basis of their systemic importance (as we discuss in detail below) and 
the degree of their off-balance-sheet exposure as documented in the ‘Bank Derivatives Reports’ 
of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). 
 
Table 1 
Sample of banks. This table reports the 20 U.S. banks which are employed in our empirical analysis.  
Bank name  
1.   BANK OF AMERICA CORP. 11. JP MORGAN CHASE & CO 
2.   BANK OF NY MELLON CORP. 12. KEYCORP 
3.   BB&T CORP. 13. NORTHERN TRUST CORP. 
4.   CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP.  14. PNC FIN. SERVICES GROUP INC. 
5.   CITIGROUP INC. 15. REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP. 
6.   CITY NATIONAL CORP. 16. STATE STREET CORP. 
7.   COMERICA INC. 17. SUNTRUST BANKS INC. 
8.   FIFTH THIRD BANKCORP 
9.   FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP. 
10. HUNTINGTON BANKSHARES INC. 
18. US BANK CORP. 
19. WELLS FARGO & CO 
20. ZIONSBANKCORP. 
 
     We incorporate a larger number of institutions in our analysis compared to previous studies 
(see, e.g., O’Hara and Shaw, 1990; Flannery & Sorescu, 1996; De Nicoló and Kwast, 2002) 
which are also focused on Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs).5 The 20 banks 
of our sample possess more than 50% of the entire sector’s total assets,6 whereas their relative 
                                                 
5
 A sample of the more recent works that belong to the burgeoning crisis literature and focus exclusively on large, 
systemically important financial institutions are those of Huang et al. (2009) that constructs a framework for 
measuring and stress testing the systemic risk of 12 U.S. major commercial and investment banks, Adrian and Shin 
(2010) that examines the procyclicality in leverage of the 5 biggest U.S. investment banks before the crisis, and 
Patro et al. (2013) that uses the 22 largest commercial and investment banks in U.S. to analyse the relevance of stock 
return correlations in assessing the level of systemic risk. 
6
 This percentage is based on the average size of each sample bank as measured by the ratio of a bank’s assets to the 
sector’s total assets over the whole data period.  
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importance (i.e., their relative size) is getting higher throughout the data period.7 In fact, the U.S. 
federal authorities have been reluctant to let any of them to go bankrupt as this would have 
shattering effects on the entire financial system. To provide strong support to this argument, we 
mention that all sample banking firms are amongst the top 50 Holding Companies as reported in 
the relevant list of the NIC/FFIEC. Further, not a single entity among those failed or acquired by 
some other financial institution from the beginning of the crisis onwards is included in our data 
set. To the contrary, all sample banks have received significant financial assistance from the U.S. 
government through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) according to data from the U.S. 
Department of Treasury. It is also important to note that, in early 2009, the U.S. government 
performed a series of stress tests on the 19 largest banks and near-banks that were of systemic 
importance for the economy. Under that exercise, which was named as Supervisory Capital 
Assessment Program (SCAP), each bank would need to safeguard that it had sufficient capital in 
case the economy got even worse. All the 14 commercial pure banking organisations which took 
part in SCAP in 2009 are included in our sample.8 9 
     To sum up, we have constructed a homogeneous set of banks which provide the bulk of 
financing to industry and households in U.S. and elsewhere, meaning that, if any of them were 
allowed to fail, this would inevitably cause, inter alia, serious systemic liquidity shortages in the 
economy.10 As a consequence, our data set is very representative of the ‘operating behaviour’ of 
this very special category of banking firms (that is, the SIFIs) and also of the way the U.S. 
banking industry operates as a whole. We, therefore, expect to get meaningful and robust 
empirical results.  
     On the basis of the discussion so far, it does not come by surprise that the banking 
organisations that comprise our data set have been engaged in non-traditional banking activities 
                                                 
7
 Several prominent studies focus on the biggest U.S. Bank Holding Companies -on the basis of their relative size- 
that account for approximately half of the total U.S. bank population: Keeley (1990), Demsetz and Strahan (1997), 
Galloway et al. (1997), just to name a few. 
8
 Five of the institutions which participated in SCAP were not part of the commercial banking industry. These were: 
American Express Company, GMAC Inc., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Metlife Inc., and Morgan Stanley. 
Apparently, none of these institutions is included in our analysis.  
9
 SCAP was limited to Holding Companies with total assets not less than $100 billion. Based on U.S. Department of 
Treasury data, the 14 banks that were qualified to participate in SCAP and take part in our sample are the following: 
Bank of America Corp., Bank of NY Mellon Corp., BB&T Corp., Capital One Financial Corp., Citigroup Inc., Fifth 
Third Bankcorp., JP Morgan Chase & Co, Keycorp, PNC Financial Services Group Inc., Regions Financial Corp., 
State Street Corp., Suntrust Banks Inc., US Bank Corp., and Wells Fargo & Co. 
10
 Clearly, institutions other than commercial banks like, for instance, insurance companies (e.g., AIG) or investment 
banks (e.g., Lehman Brothers) also had a systemic role and largely contributed to the emergence of the crisis. 
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to a much greater extent than their smaller counterparts. Large banks have indeed been entangled 
with a very broad range of bank-related activities, others than pure commercial banking activities 
like loan granting and deposit taking. These activities are explicitly defined by the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 and include, amongst others, securities dealing and underwriting, 
insurance underwriting, financial and investment advisory services, merchant banking, and 
issuing or selling securitised interests in bank-eligible assets. Indeed, literature (see, e.g., Rime 
and Stiroh, 2003) demonstrates that big banks are very prone to universal banking activities in 
contrast to small and mid-sized institutions, which are less diversified and resemble single-line 
businesses. Therefore, by relying on a sample that consists exclusively of very large financial 
entities, we expect the distinction between on- and off-balance-sheet leverage to be clear and 
transparent.  
     The key reason why we restrict our attention on commercial banks (and not, for instance, on 
investment or savings banks) is because the commercial banking sector is both heavily regulated 
and largely supervised. This is in sharp contrast to what holds for investment banks as well as 
near- and non-banks that do not rely on deposits and, hence, do not need to keep much money in 
the form of capital. To give an example, the larger U.S. investment Bank Holding Companies 
and their subsidiaries were regulated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and were 
not subjected to any leverage requirements. Indeed, under the ‘net capital rule’, light leverage 
restrictions were only imposed (at individual firm level) on the amount of customer receivables 
an investment bank could hold as a multiple of capital. In other words, the non-commercial 
banking institutions face no significant restrictions on the level of their leverage.  
     We believe it is also important to justify at this point why we focus our analysis on the U.S. 
banking sector. First and foremost, the crisis originated in the U.S. before spilled over to other 
economies around the globe. Hence, by looking at the U.S. banking industry, we are capable of 
better tracing some of the root causes of the current financial turmoil. Second, the differences in 
the accounting regimes can lead to large variations in the off-balance-sheet leverage, which lie at 
the centre of the present study. Evidently, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
allowed U.S. commercial banks to treat their SIVs and ABCP conduits as being entirely off their 
balance sheets before the crisis. In contrast, the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) that European institutions followed were somewhat less tolerant toward off-balance-sheet 
business as they required from banks to keep record of this sort of items on their balance sheets. 
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Along the same lines, the use of IFRS may result in significantly higher amounts of total assets 
and, hence, lower leverage ratios for the same or similar exposures, compared to the use of U.S. 
GAAP. The reason for this is the netting of OTC derivatives, which is allowed under the former 
reporting systems. More concretely, the netting conditions are stricter under IFRS in that the 
gross replacement value of derivatives is generally shown on the balance sheet even when 
positions are held under master netting agreements with the same counterparty. To illustrate this 
with an example, we examine Deutsche Bank’s balance sheet which is reported under both 
accounting principles. In 2009, the systemically important German bank reported an amount of 
total assets of approximately 1.5 trillion euros under IFRS standards, where total assets were 
equal to almost 0.9 trillion euros if U.S. GAAP were taken into account. Given that the reported 
equity capital is (more or less) the same under both accounting principles, the on-balance-sheet 
leverage ratio for Deutsche Bank in 2009 was much higher in IFRS values. And, of course, this 
has been the case for every other accounting year. Apparently, GAAP provided U.S. banks with 
more incentives to undertake a higher degree of leverage compared to their European 
counterparts. In consequence, our emphasis on U.S. banking organisations allows us to develop 
more solid measures of their off-balance-sheet leverage exposure, and then proceed to 
empirically gauge the effects of this exposure on individual bank soundness and on the system’s 
health, which are the key issues examined in this study. 
 
3.2. Sample period 
     The data we employ in our analysis are of quarterly frequency and cover the period 2002q1-
2012q3. We do not examine the years before 2002 mainly for two reasons. First, the two 
international financial crises which erupted in East Asia and in Russia at the end of the 90s 
together with the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis of 1998 all had a destabilising 
impact on the U.S. banking system. Second, no considerable regulatory or other similar reforms 
occurred in the U.S. banking market from 2002 onwards, meaning that the operation of banks 
has remained largely unaffected by exogenous factors throughout the examined period. In fact, 
the latest legislative activity in the U.S. that largely influenced the operation of the entire 
banking sector was the already mentioned Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which opened up 
the local market allowing commercial and investment banks, securities firms and insurance 
companies to merge their activities. If any considerable reforms had taken place in the banking 
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regulatory environment during our sample period, it would be highly likely to have exerted an 
impact on the leverage decisions of banks and hence to have biased our results.11 Indeed, it is 
well-established in the banking literature that regulation strongly affects industry structure and 
alters the behaviour of banks in terms of performance and risk-taking (see, e.g., Brissimis et al., 
2008). 
     The whole data period is divided into two sub-periods: the earlier one (2002q1-2007q2) 
includes the years before the outbreak of the crisis, that is before August 2007 when the 
difference between the yield on three-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the 
yield on three-month U.S. Treasury bills (the so-called TED spread) widened to 150-200 basis 
points relative to a historically stable range of 10-50 basis points. Apparently, the pre-crisis years 
were characterised by stable financial conditions and strong economic expansion. The second 
period extends from 2007q3 to 2012q3 and refers to the crisis period in which financial 
turbulence, uncertainty, and distress prevailed in the economy.12 
     We perform a simple Chow (1960) test for a structural break at the beginning of the crisis 
(that is, in 2007q3), and find strong evidence of a structural change. In particular, the Chow test 
rejects the null hypothesis of no break (or constant parameter values), thereby providing 
evidence that the difference in the sub-period regressions is statistically significant. We further 
split the crisis period into two and run a Chow test for the following two periods: 2007q3-2008q3 
and 2008q4-2012q3. The breakpoint in 2008q3 is based on the collapse of Lehmann Brothers on 
15 September 2008. We basically fail to reject ,	thus providing little or no evidence of 
structural changes in the on- and off-balance-sheet leverage variables which we employ in our 
analysis and are described below. 
 
3.3. Variables selection 
     In this Section, we describe the variables employed in our baseline econometric model. All 
variables together with the relevant data sources are summarised in Appendix A. 
                                                 
11It has to be mentioned here that the U.S. government enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in mid-2002 with the 
purpose to set new or enhanced disclosure standards for all U.S. public company boards including those of banking 
firms. However, that Act had a partial effect on the operation of the banking industry as it only targeted the listed 
banks; further, it was introduced in the very beginning of our sample period implying that its overall impact is 
reflected in our data.  
12
 Other recent studies -like that of Cornett et al. (2011)- also use 2007q3 as the starting point of the crisis. 
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     To start with the left-hand-side variables, we measure individual bank soundness with total 
bank risk (TOTRISK), which is calculated as the quarterly standard deviation of each sample 
bank’s daily stock market returns.13 This metric of risk captures the total volatility of equity 
prices for each individual bank. As such, it incorporates credit risk, market risk, and liquidity 
risk. To calculate TOTRISK, we first obtain the weekly (Friday-to-Friday) returns for each 
individual bank using its stock market prices:  
 
  1ln lniw iwiwR P P −= −       (1) 
 
where iwR denotes the weekly (w=1, 2, …, W) stock market returns of bank i (i=1,2,…, N=20), 
and ln iwP  stands for the natural logarithm of the weekly average of bank i’s stock market daily 
price P, where daily returns are adjusted to account for dividend payouts and stock splits. In the 
cases where Friday is a holiday and no stocks are traded, we use the Thursday-to-Friday, or 
Friday-to-Thursday returns instead. Additionally, when the return of a given stock is not 
available on a given Friday, that stock’s weekly return is coded as missing. TOTRISK is then 
obtained by the following formula: 
 
2
1
( )
1
W
iw
w
iq
R R
W
σ =
−
=
−
∑
     (2) 
 
where iqσ is the quarterly (q=2002q1, 2002q2,…, 2012q3) standard deviation of bank i‘s daily 
returns and R
 
is the quarterly average of bank i’s weekly returns. The lower-case sigma is 
strongly related to bankruptcy both statistically and conceptually: if a bank has more variable 
cash flows (and, hence, more volatile stock returns), then the bank is expected to have a higher 
probability of bankruptcy.  
     We measure systemic risk (CoVaR) relying on the approach of Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011). CoVaR is the Value at Risk (VaR) of a financial institution conditional on other 
                                                 
13
 Similar risk measures have been used in the study of Galloway et al. (1997) and -more recently- in those of 
Gonzalez (2005) and Wu et al. (2011).  
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institutions of the financial system being in distress. The analytical procedure we follow to 
calculate CoVaR is as follows: 
     We start by defining ,	
 	 as the p-quantile of the asset return 	
  that bank i will lose with 
probability p over time q, where q, as previously noted, stands for quarters: 
 
	
  ,	
          (3) 
 
We then define ,	|
as the VaR of the entire banking system (treated as a portfolio of 
banks) conditional upon bank i being in financial distress: 
 
 	  ,	|
	
  ,	
             (4) 
 
In a similar vein, we define ,	|
, !"#	as the V R of the banking system conditional 
upon bank i operating under normal conditions (i.e., when 	
  is equal to its median level): 
 
 	  ,	|
, !"#	
  	
, !"#              (5) 
 
The contribution of bank i to the risk of the whole system (systemic risk) is given by: 
 
$,	
  ,	|
 % ,	|
, !"#            (6) 
 
To estimate the contribution of bank i to systemic risk as given by $,	
  in eq. (6), we 
need to first estimate the two right-hand side terms and then calculate their simple difference. To 
this purpose, we resort to quantile regression analysis. A quantile regression, first introduced by 
Koenker and Bassett (1978), estimates the conditional probability that a variable falls below a 
given threshold (quantile) when another random variable is also below the same quantile.14 In the 
                                                 
14
 An overview of quantile regression analysis illustrated with a comprehensive empirical application can be found 
in Chernozhukov and Umantsev (2001). 
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context of CoVaR measurement, quantile regression techniques are preferred compared to their 
OLS counterparts. In Appendix B, we analytically explain the main reasons behind this. 
     We obtain ,	|
 by running the following two quantile regressions setting p equal to 
0.01, which corresponds to the 1% distress level: 
 
	
  =	&
 ' (
)	*+ ' ,	
       (7) 
 
	|
 =	&|
 ' (|
)	*+ ' -|
	
 ' ,	|
		           (8) 
 
where 	
  is the quarterly growth rate of bank i’s total assets conditional on bank i being 
distressed, and 	|
 is the quarterly growth rate of total assets of all N=20 institutions which 
comprise our banking system conditional on bank i being distressed. Both bank i’s total assets 
and system’s total assets are expressed in market values.  
     Similarly, we calculate ,	|
, !"# by running the following quantile regressions at 
the 50% level this time, where 50% corresponds to the median level of asset returns under 
normal financial and economic conditions:  
 
	
, !"#	= &
, !"# ' (
, !"#)	*+ ' ,	
, !"#    (9) 
 
	|
, !"# =	&|
, !"# ' (|
, !"#)	*+ ' -|
, !"#	
, !"# '
,./0/1234,536		        (10) 
 
where  	
, !"# is the quarterly growth rate of bank i’s total assets conditional on bank i 
operating under normal conditions and 	|
, !"#	is the quarterly growth rate of total assets 
of all N=20 banks of our system conditional on bank i’s normal operation. Like it was the case in 
eq. (7) and (8), total assets in eq. (9) and (10) are also expressed in market values. 
     In eq. (7), (8), (9) and (10), )	*+ is the one-quarter lag of the vector of the financial and 
macroeconomic state variables that influence bank soundness. These state variables are: i) the 
market return volatility measured with the implied volatility index (VIX) found in the Chicago 
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Board Options Exchange Market, ii) the liquidity risk spread given by the quarterly difference 
between the 3-month LIBOR rate and the 3-month U.S. T-bill rate, iii) the change in the slope of 
the yield curve given by the change in the quarterly difference between the 10-year U.S. T-bill 
rate and the 3-month U.S. T-bill rate, iv) the interest rate risk defined as the quarterly standard 
deviation of the day-to-day 3-month U.S. T-bill rate,15 and v) the credit risk, measured by the 
quarterly change in the credit spread between the 10-year BAA-rated bonds and the 10-year U.S. 
T-bill rate.   
     We resort to the Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003)’s unit root test for panel data to test for stationarity 
of the data series included in the return equations (eq. 7, 8, 9 and 10). This test relies upon the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) methodology and, contrary to the widely used Levin-Lin-Chu 
(2002) test, it allows for heterogeneity in both the constant and the slope terms of the ADF 
regression. We incorporate an individual specific constant term and run the test with and without 
a time deterministic trend that picks up the non-stochastic influence of common factors on asset 
returns across banks over time. The null hypothesis of the Im-Pesaran-Shin test is that the 
considered variables contain a unit root against the alternative hypothesis of stationarity. The test 
rejects the null at 1% and 5% significance levels for all series except the liquidity risk spread, 
and the credit risk. In other words, only these two data series exhibit some non-stationary 
behaviour as shown in Table 2 (Panel A).  
     Since the levels of liquidity risk spread and of credit risk are found to be integrated of order 1, 
we express the two variables in first differences with the purpose to remove the possible trends in 
their variances. The differences specification guarantees that all panels are stationary as we are 
able to reject the null hypothesis of Im-Pesaran-Shin’s test at 1% significance level for both 
variables, which implies that the non-stationary process that the two variables follow is a random 
walk. Consequently, instead of level series we include the differenced data series of liquidity risk 
spread and credit risk in the return equations (eq. 7, 8, 9 and 10). 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 This measure describes the changes in interest rates and/or security prices that are expected to have an impact on 
bank income and on the market value of bank equity. To be more specific, interest rate risk arises predominantly 
from mismatches in the durations of assets and liabilities. It, therefore, reveals the interest rate cycle movements 
which influence the deposit-taking and lending activities of banks. 
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Table 2  
Panel unit root test and cointegration test. Panel A reports the values of W-statistic from the panel unit 
root test of Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) and the corresponding p-values. All data series included in the 
return equations (eq. 7, 8, 9 and 10) in the CoVaR measurement are tested for stationarity. The null 
hypothesis under study is that of a unit root against the alternative of stationarity. Panel B summarises 
the results of the Pedroni cointegration test, which examines the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
between the variables of interest. The Pedroni test relies on four statistics: the panel v-statistic, the 
panel PP ρ-statistic, the panel PP t-statistic, and the panel DF t-statistic. These statistics account for 
common time factors and heterogeneity across the sample banking institutions.  
Panel A: Panel Unit root test   
Variables Im-Pesaran-Shin W-statistic p-value 
Growth rate of total assets                    -2.345** (0.031) 
Market return volatility                    -3.519** (0.028) 
Liquidity risk spread                    -1.810 (0.341) 
Yield curve  -3.109*** (0.007) 
Interest rate risk  -2.930*** (0.005) 
Panel B: Cointegration test Pedroni test statistics p-value 
v-statistic 0.184 (0.150) 
ρ-statistic (PP) -1.593* (0.094) 
t-statistic (PP)                      -0.328 (0.139) 
t-statistic (DF)                      -0.540 (0.111) 
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed distribution. 
 
     In view of the non-stationary characteristics of the data series of liquidity risk spread and of 
credit risk and in order to avoid spurious regression problems, we move to a panel cointegration 
framework. The cointegration test proposed by Pedroni (1999) is utilised here to show whether 
there exists a long-run relationship between the variables under study. The cointegration 
technique of Pedroni has been a significant improvement over conventional cointegration 
techniques applied in a time series framework, as it allows the cointegrating vectors to vary 
across the members of the panel data set. Examining the null of no cointegration, the Pedroni test 
is basically a test of unit roots in the estimated residuals of the panel.  
     The within dimension approach of the Pedroni test relies on four statistics: the panel v-
statistic, the panel Philips-Peron (1988) ρ-statistic, the panel Phillips-Peron (1988) t-statistic, and 
the panel Dickey-Fuller (1979) t-statistic. These statistics account for common time factors and 
heterogeneity across the sample banking institutions. The results, which are summarised in Table 
2 (Panel B), cannot reject the null of no cointegration between the examined variables. Hence, no 
long-run cointegration relationship can be established.  
     We now continue with the description of the right-hand side variables of our empirical 
analysis. We use three measures to describe the on-balance-sheet leverage of banks. These 
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measures refer to the so-called gross balance sheet leverage ratio, which is calculated as the ratio 
of bank’s total assets to the book value of total equity capital (LEV1), the inverted Tier 1 
leverage ratio (LEV2), and the ratio of total liabilities to book equity capital (LEV3). The latter 
two measures are utilised as instruments for LEV1 in the instrumental variables regression 
model, which is analytically presented in the following subsection. In that subsection, we also 
discuss why all the on- and off-balance-sheet leverage measures which are presented in the 
current paragraphs are introduced in our model in first differences instead of levels.  
     Several various measures of banks’ off-balance-sheet leverage which are complementary to 
each other are employed in our econometric analysis. More concretely, we capture derivatives 
leverage by using the on-balance-sheet asset equivalent component of the exposure implied by 
the off-balance-sheet derivative contracts. This measure is calculated by the ratio of credit 
equivalent amount of OTC derivatives outstanding to book equity capital (DERLEV1) and maps 
the off-balance-sheet derivatives positions of the sample banks onto their on-balance-sheet 
equivalents. We instrument DERLEV1 with the credit exposure across all derivative contracts 
divided by the bank regulatory capital which is given by the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital 
requirements (DERLEV2), and with the ratio of trading revenue from derivatives activities to 
total revenue (DERLEV3).16  
     In addition to the derivatives activities of banks, we also measure loan securitisation through 
conduits and other special vehicles. As earlier discussed, numerous loans and other assets were 
securitised and sold to other institutions in the years preceding the crisis. The originating banks, 
however, retained the servicing rights to the bundle of securitised loans. We thus report the ratio 
of the outstanding principal amount of loans and other assets sold and securitised with servicing 
retained or with recourse or any other credit backstops provided to total assets (SECLEV1) to 
capture the magnitude of banks’ off-balance-sheet leverage due to asset securitisation activity. 
SECLEV1 is instrumented with the amount of credit exposure arising from recourse or other 
seller-provided credit enhancements to SIVs and other conduits divided by total assets 
(SECLEV2). 
                                                 
16
 A detailed explanation of the derivation and the properties of DERLEV2 can be found in Breuer (2002). 
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    We further employ two versions of the OBS leverage ratio as proposed by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BCBS, 2009).17 The first measure is given by the sum of 
commitments, direct credit substitutes, acceptances, and repurchase agreements divided by the 
book equity capital (OBSLEV1). The second measure (OBSLEV2) is employed as an instrument 
for OBSLEV1 and is equal to the ratio of standby letters of credit and guarantees to the regulatory 
capital. Apparently, securitised assets and derivative contracts which are captured in the 
measures discussed above are neither considered in OBSLEV1, nor in OBSLEV2. This reveals the 
complementary nature of the off-balance-sheet leverage measures we employ in our analysis, 
which is confirmed by the relevant pairwise tests which are performed further below. 
     Following Angrist and Krueger (2001), Hausman (2001), and Murray (2006), the instruments 
we employ in our econometric analysis are all variants on the same theme. To give an example, 
DERLEV1 is instrumented with DERLEV2 and DERLEV3 as already mentioned. Both these 
instruments express the activity of the sample banks in derivatives markets but from different 
perspectives. In particular, DERLEV2 follows a regulatory approach of the exposure of banks in 
derivative contracts since its denominator is given by the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. 
DERLEV3, on the other hand, reflects the revenue stream which is generated from derivatives 
trading activity. Hence, the economic relationship that holds between DERLEV1 and its 
instruments is straightforward and this is also true for the other endogenous regressors of our 
model. Of course, economic intuition need not stand naked and alone; intuition must be tested 
and confirmed. For this reason, we also use a set of alternative instruments for DERLEV1 which 
are again variants on the same theme, and we do the same with the rest of the endogenous 
variables. We add them one by one in our regression model and check the robustness of our 
results. Parameter estimates are not found to vary a lot, which provides justification to the 
economic criteria we apply to select our instruments. 
     In Table 3 that follows, we perform Pearson pairwise correlation tests for the two risk 
variables as well as for the on- and off-balance-sheet leverage measures and their instruments. 
The tests are performed for both the pre-crisis and the crisis periods (see Panel A and Panel B, 
respectively). We observe that the correlations between the same types of leverage are significant 
at 1% and 5% levels. However, no (or low) statistically significant correlations are reported 
                                                 
17
 The BIS off-balance-sheet ratio is considerably similar to the one used by the Bank of Canada. The main 
difference between the two ratios is the values of transaction- and trade-related contingencies which are added in the 
numerator of the Canadian leverage ratio, but not in that of the BIS ratio. 
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between the different leverage types like, for example, between LEV1 and OBSLEV1, or between 
SECLEV2 and OBSLEV2. This verifies that the chosen off-balance-sheet leverage measures are 
indeed complementary to each other in the sense that do not overlap one another thus covering 
the broad spectrum of modern banking activities. We, moreover, observe that CoVaR is 
significantly correlated with TOTRISK only in the pre-crisis period.  
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     The combination of the recent financial stability literature (see, e.g., Berger et al., 2009; Uhde 
and Heimeshoff, 2009) and bank risk literature (see, e.g., Gonzalez, 2005) provides us with the 
basis for the selection of two metrics for possible alterations in the traditional services of banks. 
The first is banks’ asset composition (ASSETCOMP) that captures the changes in bank lending 
activity. This is measured by the ratio of net loans and leases to total assets. The second is a 
measure for the composition of bank liabilities (LIABCOMP), which shows any changes in the 
traditional funding sources of banks and which is calculated as the ratio of demand deposits to 
total liabilities. 
     It is widely accepted that economic performance has a considerable impact on demand and 
supply of banking services. More precisely, high levels of banking activity are generally related 
to favourable economic conditions like price stability and economic development. In this 
context, the macroeconomic environment is largely considered to have an effect on the risk-
taking behaviour of banks. We thus employ the quarterly change in the U.S. Consumer Price 
Index (INF) to control for fluctuations in the level of prices, and the GDP output gap (GDP) to 
control for variations in economic growth. 
     Importantly, we trace the history of each banking firm in our sample to investigate whether a 
bank has experienced some merger and/or acquisition (M&A) over the entire data period. To 
achieve this, we resort to the relevant information provided by NIC/FFIEC. We find that the 
great majority of our sample banks and, more specifically, 18 out of 20 banks have been 
involved in at least one M&A transaction over the examined period. However, it is important to 
mention here that none of these banks has been targeted from some other financial institution; to 
the contrary, all 18 banks have only been acted as acquirers in these M&A deals. This 
strengthens even further our choice of sample banks on the basis of their systemic importance, 
which has been analytically discussed earlier in the paper. We control for the possible impact of 
M&As with the purpose any spurious bursts of systemic risk and individual bank risk due to 
M&A transactions to be excluded from our sample. We introduce a dummy variable in our 
model (MA), which is equal to unity in the quarter q that bank i has been involved in some M&A 
transaction. For example, if a transaction has occurred on, say, April 15 2008, then this 
transaction is recorded in the second quarter of 2008, meaning that the binary variable MA takes 
the value of one in 2008q2. 
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     Table 4 reports the summary statistics for all the variables we employ in our analysis for each 
of the two periods under examination. What mainly comes out from these statistics and is 
important for our research is the reported upsurge in the off-balance-sheet leverage activities of 
banks during the pre-crisis period, which is followed by a downward trend in all such kind of 
activities in the later time period. This supports the argument that banking institutions 
accumulated a high degree of leverage off their balance sheets during the economic upturn, 
whilst they moved to reduce their off-balance-sheet holdings by large after the eruption of the 
crisis in mid-2007. Moreover, total bank risk is found to be on average higher in the years before 
the outbreak of the crisis compared to the post-2007q2 period. The converse holds true for 
systemic risk, which shows an upward trend in the crisis era. 
 
    Table 4 
Descriptive statistics. The summary statistics of all the variables employed in our baseline 
empirical analysis are reported in this table. Panel A shows the statistics for the pre-crisis period 
which extends from 2002q1 to 2007q2, while Panel B refers to the crisis period that commences in 
2007q3 and ends in 2012q3. Variables are distinguished into four main categories: the left-hand 
side risk variables, the leverage variables, the bank-specific control variables, and those variables 
that capture the macroeconomic environment. The description of each variable together with the 
relevant data sources are provided in Appendix A.  
Panel A: Pre-crisis period 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum St. Dev. Obs 
Risk variables 
TOTRISK 2.287 1.212 5.259 0.214 2.221 432 
CoVaR  3.112 2.860 7.194 0.713 1.890 429 
Leverage variables 
LEV1 7.879 7.174 12.121 5.732 0.256 436 
LEV2 0.121 0.118 0.197 0.069 0.021 435 
LEV3  7.123 6.875 10.564 4.784 0.598 436 
DERLEV1 10.989 9.112 17.804 3.731 3.098 419 
DERLEV2 1.865 1.775 3.122 0.484 2.883 427 
DERLEV3  3.167 3.001 5.713 0.965 1.119 426 
SECLEV1 7.005 6.603 11.434 1.740 1.794 431 
SECLEV2 11.995 10.953 21.805 3.842 1.980 432 
OBSLEV1 14.719 13.992 26.141 3.095 2.395 420 
OBSLEV2 9.813 9.175 19.530 1.408 3.592 421 
Traditional banking variables 
ASSETCOMP 0.522 0.513 0.798 0.185 0.178 438 
LIABCOMP 0.223 0.208 0.421 0.063 0.063 439 
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MA  0.154 0.143 1.000 0.000 0.211 440 
Macroeconomic environment 
INF 0.036 0.034 0.093 -0.035 0.086 439 
GDP  0.026 0.023 0.067 -0.019 1.514 439 
        
Panel B: Crisis period 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum St. Dev. Obs 
Risk variables 
TOTRISK 1.989 1.897 4.342 0.089 1.341 401 
CoVaR 6.959 6.794 10.853 2.805 1.852 392 
 
       
Leverage variables 
LEV1  6.184 5.953 10.909 3.882 0.954 413 
LEV2 0.110 0.107 0.174 0.041 0.017 413 
LEV3  6.007 5.843 8.904 3.211 0.765 412 
DERLEV1 5.999 5.755 12.004 0.653 4.783 400 
DERLEV2 1.126 1.100 2.275 0.087 3.341 397 
DERLEV3  1.605 1.509 3.009 0.252 3.006 404 
SECLEV1 4.976 4.672 8.843 0.656 2.845 407 
SECLEV2 8.784 8.432 14.734 1.956 2.165 408 
OBSLEV1 9.643 9.462 19.943 1.134 2.742 389 
OBSLEV2 7.683 7.459 15.629 0.747 4.131 392 
Traditional banking variables 
ASSETCOMP 0.652 0.643 1.074 0.099 0.349 416 
LIABCOMP 0.241 0.231 0.382 0.061 0.089 417 
        
MA 0.127 0.119 1.000 0.000 0.087 420 
        
Macroeconomic environment 
INF -0.029 -0.032 0.121 -0.274 3.731 418 
GDP  -0.034 -0.038 0.282 -0.341 4.174 418 
 
     As regards the data sources, all bank accounting variables are obtained from the FR Y-9C 
forms filed by U.S. Bank Holding Companies with the Federal Reserve. We also collect data 
from OCC’s Quarterly Reports on Bank Derivatives Activities to develop the off-balance-sheet 
leverage measures employed in our analysis. The market interest rates used in the construction of 
total bank risk (TOTRISK) and of systemic risk (CoVaR) are obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream, GFDatabase, and Moody’s. As concerns the short-term interest rates, which are also 
needed for the production of CoVaR, these are taken from the Federal Reserve Board website 
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and the U.S. Department of the Treasury. To continue, data on M&As are collected from 
NIC/FFIEC, as previously mentioned. Finally, inflation data are obtained from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor, whereas GDP data are taken from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 
3.4. The model  
     To evaluate the effects of leverage and reverse leverage on individual bank soundness and on 
systemic risk, we estimate the following model:  
 
7
	  &
	 ' (+,
	$89
	 ' (:,
	$;9891
	 ' (=,
	$>9891
	 ' (?,
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' -+,
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	 ' -:,
	8DBA@)
	 ' -=,
	)B
	
' E+,	DFG	 ' E:,	H;	 ' ,
	 
(11) 
                         where: i=1, 2…, N=20 
                                    q=2002q1, 2002q2,…,Q=2012q3 
 
In our model, Yiq stands for either TOTRISK, or CoVaR; $891
	 , $;9891
	,	$>9891
	 ,
$@A>891
		are the average quarterly changes in LEV1, DERLEV1, SECLEV1, and OBSLEV1, 
respectively;	B>>9C@)
	 , 8DBA@)
	 , )B
	 are the three bank-specific control variables; 
DFG	 , H;	 are the two macroeconomic variables; εiq is the regression error term, whereas the 
vectors α, β, γ, and δ contain the parameters of interest to be estimated. The reason why the on- 
and the off-balance-sheet leverage variables are introduced in the model in first differences 
rather than in levels is because we wish to capture the effects of increasing (positive) and 
declining (negative) trends of leverage on bank risk-taking and systemic risk.  
     It is likely that our model suffers from endogeneity bias as regressors may be endogenously 
determined along with the dependent variables. At a micro-level, i.e. when TOTRISK is 
considered to be the dependent variable of our model, the cause for this is, presumably, the 
endogenous character of leverage and risk-taking decisions, which are both taken from bank 
managers. Of course, we recognise that these decisions depend to some extent on the rules 
imposed on banking firms by regulatory and supervisory authorities. Nonetheless, even under 
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these constraints that managers face in their banks’ profit maximisation problem, it is their own 
decisions that eventually affect the level of leverage and the degree of risk-taking.  
     From a macroprudential perspective, systemic risk -captured by CoVaR- is viewed as being 
dependent on the collective leverage behaviour of banks and, as such, is very likely to be 
endogenous. To be more specific, the leverage decisions of banks have an impact on the 
quantities transacted (e.g., borrowed and lent), the prices of financial assets, and, subsequently, 
on the soundness of the economy and the stability of the entire financial system. This, in turn, 
has powerful feedback effects on the health of banking institutions, which affects their ability to 
extent credit by leveraging their resources.  
     Parameter estimates from simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression might be biased in 
the case of endogeneity and this can lead to erroneous inference. To tackle the problem of 
potential endogeneity, we estimate the model by means of two-stage least squares instrumental 
variables (2SLS IV) regression for each of the two examined periods. Therefore, ∆LEV1 is 
instrumented with ∆LEV2 and ∆LEV3 in the first-stage OLS regressions. Similarly, ∆DERLEV2 
and ∆DERLEV3 are used as instruments for ∆DERLEV1, whereas ∆SECLEV1 is instrumented 
with ∆SECLEV2, and ∆OBSLEV1 with ∆OBSLEV2. The second-stage regressions of the 2SLS 
IV approach are then estimated with the predicted values of ∆LEV1, ∆DERLEV1, ∆SECLEV1, 
and ∆OBSLEV1.  
     To estimate eq. 11 we rely on a set of variables that we observe over time and which have 
been already described in Section 3.3. Nevertheless, there might exist some unobserved variables 
which are likely to have an impact on the examined relationship and are not incorporated in our 
model. Omitted variables in general can be either constant over time, or time-dependent. 
Regardless of their time dimension, omitted variables are difficult, or sometimes impossible to 
be measured and be controlled for. If we search to find instrumental variables, or proxies, for the 
likely omitted variables, a series of rather strong assumptions which are hardly met in practice 
has to be made. Moreover, it is necessary to know how to correctly model each omitted 
variable’s influence on the dependent variable of the regression equation as well as the 
relationship that holds between the instruments and the possible omitted variables. Most 
importantly, it is hard to identify the specific variables which are correlated with the main model 
variables thus producing flawed estimates and which have been omitted from the model.  
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     We include individual (bank-level) fixed effects in our regression analysis to account for the 
influence of the time-invariant factors which are correlated with our main variables. Fixed effects 
can control for these factors as they focus on within-bank variation. Further, a statistical test that 
unobserved bank heterogeneity does not drive the empirical findings is provided by the use of 
fixed effects. From this perspective, the choice of the fixed-effects estimator is based on the view 
that our sample banks are not drawn randomly from the entire population of U.S. banks; rather, 
as previously discussed, our sample consists of all the major U.S. banking companies, which 
have a systemically important role in the U.S. economy. 
     The fixed-effects model is more appropriate when differences across banks deemed to be 
substantial, time-invariant, and correlated with the explanatory variables. The random-effects 
model, on the other hand, is appropriate when correlated omitted variables are not an issue to be 
considered. Given the potential for omitted variables bias and the importance of bank-specific 
effects in our model setup, we anticipate the fixed-effects approach to be the most appropriate 
one. Indeed, we can easily reject the use of random effects on the basis of the Hausman (1978) 
test. At standard levels of statistical significance (i.e., 1% and 5%), we reject the null hypothesis 
that the differences in coefficients obtained from the two estimation methods are not significant. 
Accordingly the fixed-effects model is our preferred estimator.18  
     Before moving to discuss the produced outcome of the regression analysis, we use the 
Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test to examine the stationarity of our data set. The 
Maddala and Wu test is a Fisher-type test, which combines the p-values of the test-statistic for a 
unit root in each sample bank. This test does not necessarily require a balanced panel data set 
like most of the relevant tests do. We reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at the 5% 
significance level for all the variables of our model. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 From a theoretical viewpoint, Hsiao (1986) argues that, when inferences are made about a population of effects 
from which those in the data are considered to be a random sample then the effects must be considered as random. 
As analytically explained in Section 3.1, our data set covers the 20 U.S. systemically important banking institutions 
and, as such, it cannot be considered as a small sample of a much larger population of systemically important 
institutions. That is, even from a conceptual viewpoint, the fixed-effects model is more appropriate than its random-
effects counterpart. 
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4. Discussion of the empirical results  
4.1. First-stage results  
     The results of the first-stage regressions of the 2SLS IV approach for both data periods are 
summarised in Tables 5a and 5b that follow. We resort to Sargan-Hansen test (or J-test for 
overidentifying restrictions) which relies on the studies of Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982) to 
examine whether the chosen instrumental variables are correlated with the error term of the 
model. This is, in fact, the essential condition for an instrumental variable to be valid. The 
application of the Hansen J-test provides us with p-values which range from 0.264 to 0.464. We 
therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis that overidentifying restrictions are valid thus 
providing support to the validity of the selected instruments. We also examine the joint statistical 
significance of our instruments using a heteroskedasticity-robust F-statistic test. The results of 
the F-test confirm the validity of the instrumental variables used in our analysis. 
     It is important to mention at this point that, in practice, it is not easy to know whether an 
explanatory variable is endogenous or not. Apparently, if the OLS estimators are consistent, they 
should be preferred from those obtained with 2SLS IV regression. To deal with this in our 
baseline model (eq.11), we test the null hypothesis of no endogeneity against its alternative using 
the Hausman’s (1978) test: 
 
:	J	KL:, ,M  0 
+:	J	KL:, ,M O 0 
 
In essence, what the Hausman test does is to evaluate the significance of two estimators obtained 
with different econometric techniques: one with OLS, and the other with 2SLS IV. If a statistical 
difference is documented between the two estimators, then our concern of endogeneity is 
substantiated. The Hausman test we run examines the null hypothesis of no statistically 
significant difference between the OLS and 2SLS IV estimates. Table 5a and Table 5b show that 
the calculated Hausman p-values are all lower than the selected level of statistical significance (α 
= 0.05 οr 5%). This is to say, our concern of endogeneity is substantiated and this provides 
support to the use of 2SLS IV instead of OLS. 
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4.2. Second-stage results  
     The estimation results of the second-stage regressions are presented in Tables 6a and 6b 
below. The former table shows the estimation output using TOTRISK as the dependent variable 
of the model; the latter relies on systemic risk (CoVaR) regressions. The left column in each 
table reports the empirical results for the time period preceding the emergence of the crisis, while 
the right column contains the results for the crisis period.  
 
Table 6a 
Second-stage regression results. This table presents the second-stage results obtained 
by 2SLS IV fixed-effects regression analysis for the pre-crisis period (2002q1-
2007q2) and for the crisis period (2007q3-2012q3). The dependent variable is total 
bank risk (TOTRISK). The main explanatory variables are the average quarterly 
changes in: on-balance-sheet leverage (∆LEV1), derivatives leverage (∆DERLEV1), 
leverage from securitisation (∆SECLEV1), and off-balance-sheet leverage ratio 
(∆OBSLEV1). All explanatory variables are instrumented in the first stage; the 
instrumental variables are: ∆LEV2, ∆LEV3, ∆DERLEV2, ∆DERLEV3, ∆SECLEV2, 
and ∆OBSLEV2. The set of bank-specific control variables used in our analysis 
includes the asset composition of banks’ balance sheets (ASSETCOMP), banks’ 
liabilities composition (LIABCOMP), and a dummy variable which accounts for 
M&A transactions (MA). Two macroeconomic control variables are also used: the 
level of inflation (INF) and the level of economic growth (GDP). A detailed 
description of each variable can be found in Appendix A. A constant term is 
included in the regression model, but is not reported in the table. Heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
    TOTRISK 
  Pre-crisis period   Crisis period 
∆LEV1 
 
0.089*** 
 
-0.009*** 
  
(5.07) 
 
(-2.34) 
∆DERLEV1 
 
1.041*** 
 
-0.784** 
  
(4.75) 
 
(-1.77) 
∆SECLEV1 
 
1.119** 
 
-1.005*** 
  
(1.87) 
 
(-4.21) 
∆OBSLEV1 
 
0.834*** 
 
-0.193*** 
  
(2.52) 
 
(-1.99) 
ASSETCOMP 
 
-4.767*** 
 
-3.163** 
  
(-2.44) 
 
(-1.80) 
LIABCOMP 
 
-1.702** 
 
-0.932** 
  
(-1.79) 
 
(-1.73) 
MA  0.012  0.016 
  (1.21)  (0.98) 
INF 
 
-0.099** 
 
-0.052*** 
  
(-1.76) 
 
(-2.07) 
GDP  -1.165**  -0.865* 
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  (-1.86)  (-1.61) 
     
     
Observations 
 
419 
 
389 
:  0.163  0.179 
     
F-statistic   11.54  10.88 
p-value  0.00  0.00 
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed 
distribution. 
 
 
Table 6b 
Second-stage regression results. This table presents the second-stage results obtained 
by 2SLS IV fixed-effects regression analysis for the pre-crisis period (2002q1-
2007q2) and for the crisis period (2007q3-2012q3). The dependent variable is 
systemic risk (CoVaR). The main explanatory variables are the average quarterly 
changes in: on-balance-sheet leverage (∆LEV1), derivatives leverage (∆DERLEV1), 
leverage from securitisation (∆SECLEV1), and off-balance-sheet leverage ratio 
(∆OBSLEV1). All explanatory variables are instrumented in the first stage; the 
instrumental variables are: ∆LEV2, ∆LEV3, ∆DERLEV2, ∆DERLEV3, ∆SECLEV2, 
and ∆OBSLEV2. The set of bank-specific control variables used in our analysis 
includes the asset composition of banks’ balance sheets (ASSETCOMP), banks’ 
liabilities composition (LIABCOMP), and a dummy variable which accounts for 
M&A transactions (MA). Two macroeconomic control variables are also used: the 
level of inflation (INF) and the level of economic growth (GDP). A detailed 
description of each variable can be found in Appendix A. A constant term is 
included in the regression model, but is not reported in the table. Heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
    CoVaR 
  Pre-crisis period   Crisis period 
∆LEV1 
 
0.165*** 
 
0.197** 
  
(2.31) 
 
(1.69) 
∆DERLEV1 
 
0.078*** 
 
0.286*** 
  
(4.31) 
 
(4.24) 
∆SECLEV1 
 
0.552*** 
 
0.669** 
  
(1.99) 
 
(1.75) 
∆OBSLEV1 
 
0.834** 
 
1.275*** 
  
(1.87) 
 
(2.03) 
ASSETCOMP 
 
1.304 
 
0.899 
  
(1.29) 
 
(1.41) 
LIABCOMP 
 
0.868 
 
1.103 
  
(0.99) 
 
(0.90) 
MA  0.028  0.033 
  (1.32)  (1.14) 
INF 
 
-1.106*** 
 
-1.539*** 
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(-2.46) 
 
(-1.97) 
GDP  -1.883**  -2.376* 
  (-1.89)  (-1.76) 
     
     
Observations 
 
406 
 
375 
:  0.144  0.129 
     
F-statistic   14.12  12.76 
p-value  0.00  0.00 
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed 
distribution. 
 
4.2.1. The pre-crisis period  
     A positive and statistically significant impact of ∆LEV1 on both TOTRISK and CoVaR is 
reported. This implies that, before the outbreak of the crisis, the on-balance-sheet leverage 
exerted an increasing effect not only on the degree of total bank risk, but, most importantly, on 
the risk exposure of the entire banking system. Along the same lines, the risk profile of 
individual banks was deteriorated and the level of systemic risk was raised as a result of the 
expansion of the off-balance-sheet business of baking institutions. These are revealed by the 
significantly positive relationship we document between ∆DERLEV1, ∆SECLEV1 and 
∆OBSLEV1 with TOTRISK and CoVaR. In fact, by comparing the coefficient values on 
∆DERLEV1, ∆SECLEV1 and ∆OBSLEV1 with that on ∆LEV1, we can argue that off-balance-
sheet leverage played a relatively more harmful role for both the health of individual banks and 
for the stability of the entire system. To sum up, in the years before the onset of the crisis, the 
growth in bank leverage through derivatives in association with the increase in securitisation 
activity, and the expansion of other off-balance-sheet undertakings seriously hurt the health of 
individual banks and, at the same time, produced substantial instability to the system. 
     Consistently, over the past decade or more, banks responded to the increased demand for 
credit instruments with higher yield by developing financial engineering techniques and creating 
modern types of products.19 Although these developments may have come about as a result of 
the wider financial advances aimed at increasing the profitability of banks, strengthening their 
risk profile, and improving the efficiency of the system, they also provided opportunities for 
                                                 
19
 The banking literature provides ample empirical evidence on the upsurge in the volume of modern activities of 
U.S. banking institutions before the crisis (see, e.g., Rogers and Sinkey, 1999; Stiroh, 2004).  
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growing off-balance-sheet leverage and for shifting risks amongst market participants in highly 
complicated ways. Consequently, according to our findings, most of the (then) new financial 
instruments were indeed opaque and masked the extent of leverage and interconnectedness of 
risk, which appeared to be spilled-over across a wide range of institutions and markets 
worldwide.  
 
4.2.2. The crisis period  
     Let us now turn to analyse the regression output for the crisis period. During that period, the 
off-balance-sheet holdings of banks were largely reduced as earlier shown in the relevant 
summary statistics. When asset prices and liquidity started falling in mid-to-late 2007, the 
collateral values of assets held by financial institutions deteriorated. This made it difficult for 
banking institutions to raise funds and, hence, the majority of banks were forced to decrease 
leverage. The shrink of leverage (deleveraging), though probably led to further asset price 
reductions, occurred mainly off the balance sheet of banks improving their risk profile by 
lowering their overall risk-taking, as revealed by the significantly negative link between 
∆DERLEV1, ∆SECLEV1 and ∆OBSLEV1 with TOTRISK. For example, by focusing on the 
impact of ∆SECLEV1 on TOTRISK, we can argue that the low-quality subprime loans offered by 
U.S. banks to their conduits and other relevant financial vehicles before the onset of the crisis put 
an upward pressure on their overall risk-taking. The collapse of those financial organisations 
when the crisis erupted led to the decrease in the off-balance-sheet leverage of banks and, hence, 
to the reduction of the stand-alone bank risk.  
     Equally strong in terms of statistical significance, but not that strong in terms of the estimated 
coefficient value if compared to the corresponding coefficient values of the off-balance-sheet 
leverage variables, is the effect of the traditional leverage of banks (as captured by ∆LEV1) on 
TOTRISK. On the whole, we can maintain that both the on- and off-balance-sheet deleveraging 
process which commenced immediately after the outbreak of the crisis has strengthened the 
soundness of banking institutions on an individual basis. To the contrary, a serious threat to 
systemic stability was formed after the beginning of the crisis by the large number of bad assets 
that SIFIs used to hold (and still do, though to a decreased extent) in their portfolios as a result of 
the above-described deleveraging process. This is reflected in the positive link we report between 
the on- and off-balance-sheet leverage measures and CoVaR.  
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4.2.3. Across the two periods 
     Both ASSETCOMP and LIABCOMP are found to have a significantly negative effect on 
TOTRISK across the two data periods under study.  By contrast, the impact of these two variables 
on CoVaR is not statistically significant in any of the two periods. We can therefore postulate 
that the banks which concentrate on traditional bank lending activities contribute less to the 
overall individual bank risk, even though the business mix of traditional banking services is not 
statistically related to the stability of the whole banking system. 
     We can make an effort to combine the above-described positive impact of traditional banking 
products on total risk with the negative effect of off-balance-sheet business on risk as reported in 
the pre-crisis period. Evidently, the relationship that holds between the diversification of bank 
output through the production and release of modern financial items with risk can be either 
negative or positive. In the former case, there are at least two channels through which product 
diversification leads to a reduction in the overall bank risk-taking. The first, which is largely 
related to the conventional wisdom among banking scholars (see, e.g., Papanikolaou, 2009) and 
practitioners, shows that non-interest (fee) income, which is produced by innovative financial 
assets, is less sensitive to changes in the economic and business environment than interest 
income, which is produced by traditional assets like bank loans. This is to say that banks which 
rely more on the former type of income are typically exposed to less risk as they manage to 
reduce the cyclical variations in profits and revenues. Turning to the second channel, in case 
there is a negative or a weak correlation between the above two sorts of income, then -according 
to the traditional banking and portfolio theories (see, e.g., Diamond, 1984)- any observed 
increase in the share of fee-generating business in the overall portfolio of banking items reduces 
the volatility of total earnings via diversification effects. As a consequence, risk is again reduced.  
     Nevertheless, every coin has two sides: in line with our empirical findings for the pre-crisis 
period, DeYoung and Roland (2001) argue that non-interest income is less stable compared to its 
interest counterpart, implying that non-traditional products and services increase bank riskiness, 
while the converse holds true for the traditional banking operations. This happens mainly due to 
the following three reasons: the nature of bank-customer relationships, the particular input mixes, 
and the lower capital requirements for fee-generating activities.  
     To start with the first reason, traditional activities like loan issuance generate relatively stable 
relationships between the banks and their customers in that the switching and information costs 
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for both lenders and borrowers are high and, hence, it is not in the interest of either side to walk 
away from this sort of stable relationships. To the contrary, the aforementioned costs are lower in 
the case of modern financial products and this renders the demand for the latter lines of business 
far from solid and continuous. Accordingly, where interest income appears to be rather stable, 
non-interest income is highly likely to fluctuate over time.  
     Second, a banking institution can extend a lending relationship only with a burden on its 
variable cost (i.e., interest expenses). However, if the bank takes the decision to increase the 
volume of non-traditional services offered to its customers, it will have to hire additional fixed 
labour inputs and this will inevitably lead to an increase in its operating leverage. A higher 
operating leverage, in turn, is expected to amplify revenue volatility into higher profit volatility. 
That is, the involvement in modern banking activities that produce off-balance-sheet leverage is 
again related to a higher degree of risk.  
     Finally, the banking regulatory environment, as described in Basel I and II, allowed banks to 
hold just a small amount of capital against fee-based activities in comparison with the amount 
they were required to hold for traditional items and which was significantly higher than the 
former one. These differences in capital adequacy requirements suggest an enhanced degree of 
financial leverage, which is related to higher earnings volatility for non-traditional banking 
business.  
     An additional finding that remains unchanged across the two periods under scrutiny is that 
GDP and INF are significantly negatively related with both TOTRISK and CoVaR. This suggests 
that economic growth which, as expected, is accompanied by a higher price level, boosts banking 
soundness and contributes to the establishment of safer financial systems regardless of the state 
of the economy (upturns vs. downturns). In this context, the macroeconomic environment is 
largely considered to have an impact on the risk-taking behaviour of banks as well as on the 
stability of the entire financial system. Lastly, we find that M&As do not significantly affect 
TOTRISK and CoVaR regardless of the time period under consideration.  
 
5. Robustness analysis 
     To test the robustness of our results, we replace TOTRISK and CoVaR with two alternative 
metrics of individual bank soundness and of systemic risk. These are the ZSCORE and the 
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), respectively. 
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     ZSCORE is a measure of bank insolvency risk and is calculated as follows:  
     Let failure occurs when the total equity capital (TE) of a bank is smaller than its losses where 
–π stands for negative profits:  
C9 P %Q       (12) 
 
Then, the bank’s probability of failure can be written in the following way: 
 
KC9 P %QM  KQ P %C9M    RST P %
UV
UW  K@B P %
SX
STM       (13) 
 
where K∙M is a probability and @BK21Z5/	@5	B//21/M  Q/CB, with π is measured with 
bank’s Net Income After Taxes and TA stands for Total Assets. Suppose that   @B and  
\  %SXST, where r and λ are two random variables. We can then write that:  
 
K P \M  ] ^KM_`*a              (14) 
 
where  ^KM is a density function. If r is assumed to follow a normal distribution, we can rewrite 
the likelihood of bankruptcy in terms of the standard normal density Ψ(·) as follows: 
 
K P \M  ] bKcM_cd*a             (15) 
 
where  c  !*ef  and g 
`*e
f  with ρ being the true mean and σ the standard deviation of r.
20
 
ZSCORE is the sample estimate of –z (since z<0) and is defined in the following way for each 
sample bank and for each sample quarter:  
 
( / )
,( )
iq iq iq
iq
iq
ROA TE TA
Z
ROAσ
+
=      i = 1, 2…, N=20;  q=2002q1, 2002q2,…,Q=2012q3     (16) 
 
                                                 
20
 Normality is a rather strong assumption for the distribution of r. Nevertheless, because of Chebyshev’s inequality, 
we know that regardless of the distribution of r, the upper bound to the bankruptcy probability is: 
K  \M  h ij % \k 	
:  1g: 
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where itROA stands for the Return On Assets of bank i calculated by the ratio of net income to 
total assets (TAiq); ( / )iq iqTE TA is the ratio of total equity to total assets; and ( )iqROAσ is the 
period standard deviation of ROA which captures the volatility of bank returns. Hence, ZSCORE 
combines profitability, capital risk, and return volatility in a single measure. Evidently, it is 
increasing in banks’ average profitability and capital strength and decreasing in return 
variability. Overall, larger values of ZSCORE imply lower probability of default and, hence, 
greater bank soundness. Since ZSCORE is highly skewed, we follow the recent literature (see, 
e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Schaeck et al., 2012) and use its log transformation in our 
analysis. 
     The alternative measure of systemic risk which we construct is MES as proposed by Acharya 
et al. (2012). MES measures how bank i’s risk exposure adds to the system’s overall risk and, as 
such, it can be viewed as a straightforward alternative of CoVaR. It is based upon the established 
in the banking literature measure of Expected Shortfall (ES). ES is defined as the expected loss 
of a financial institution conditional on the loss being larger than VaR: 
 
9>l  %9K ∣   %"M             (17) 
 
where VaR is the maximum value loss with confidence 1-α, that is,  	
K P %"M  & . If we decompose banking sector’s return R into the sum of each sample 
bank i’s returns 
, we get that   ∑ 0


  where 0
 is the weight (in terms of size) given to 
bank i.21 We use the formula of ES (see above) to get that: 
 
9>l  %∑ 0

 9K
 ∣   %"M           (18) 
 
By calculating the first order conditions with respect to the weight 0
, we obtain the sensitivity of 
the risk of the entire system to the risk exposure of bank i:  
  
oXpq
or  %9K
 ∣   %"M ≡ )9>l


          (19) 
                                                 
21
 The notation followed here is the same with that used in the construction of CoVaR. 
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We estimate MES at a risk level of α = 0.05 or 5% using daily data of Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS) returns from Bloomberg. Specifically, we first pick up the 5% worst days for an equally-
weighted portfolio of CDS returns on the banks of our sample in every quarter, and then compute 
the CDS return for any given sample bank for these particular days. 
     In our robustness checks, apart from replacing TOTRISK and CoVaR with ZSCORE and MES 
respectively, all bank leverage variables are instrumented with their past realisations under the 
thought that the latter are given before the current leverage values are realised. Lagged values of 
bank leverage are not expected to be systematically correlated with changes in the current levels 
of leverage, especially when these changes are due to some unforeseen event like the global 
financial crisis.22 Admittedly, selecting the number of lagged differences to be smaller than the 
correct ones may distort the size of the tests, while selecting orders which are larger is likely to 
result in a significant loss of power. We thus consider all possible lag orders as these selected by 
two of the most popular model selection criteria, namely the Akaike Information Criterion and 
the Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion. We instrument leverage variables with their 
second- and third-period lags since their first-order lags are not selected by the aforementioned 
criteria as valid instruments. The use of longer lags is based on the supposition that they can 
provide better instruments as they can potentially reduce the possible correlation between the 
instruments and the disturbances in the error term of the original regression. 
     In addition, we incorporate time (quarterly) dummies in our model to allow for common 
factors that may have an influence on individual bank risk and on systemic risk over time. By 
doing so, we can capture the unobserved as well as the non-measurable time-varying 
characteristics of the likely omitted variables, and also those of the other variables included in 
our model. Before estimating the model, Maddala and Wu (1999) unit root tests are carried out to 
ensure the stationarity of our panel data sets. All data series are found to be stationary.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 A number of studies in the banking literature use lagged values of the endogenous variables in their instrumental 
variable analysis. Two of the most recent studies which follow this approach are those of Elsas et al. (2010) and 
Cornett et al. (2011). 
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Table 7a 
Robustness tests. This table presents the second-stage results obtained by 2SLS IV 
fixed-effects regression analysis for the pre-crisis period (2002q1-2007q2) and for 
the crisis period (2007q3-2012q3). The dependent variable is bank insolvency risk 
(ZSCORE). The main explanatory variables are the average quarterly changes in: on-
balance-sheet leverage (∆LEV1), derivatives leverage (∆DERLEV1), leverage from 
securitisation (∆SECLEV1), and off-balance-sheet leverage ratio (∆OBSLEV1). All 
explanatory variables are instrumented in the first stage. The instrumental variables 
are given by the two- and three-period lags of ∆LEV1, ∆DERLEV1, ∆SECLEV1, and 
∆OBSLEV1 according to the Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz-
Bayesian Information Criterion. The set of bank-specific control variables employed 
in our analysis includes the asset composition of banks’ balance sheets 
(ASSETCOMP), banks’ liabilities composition (LIABCOMP), and a dummy variable 
which accounts for M&A transactions (MA).Two macroeconomic control variables 
are also used: the level of inflation (INF) and the level of economic growth (GDP). 
A detailed description of each variable can be found in Appendix A. A constant term 
with time (quarterly) dummies is included in the regression models, but is not 
reported in the table. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
    ZSCORE 
  Pre-crisis period   Crisis period 
∆LEV1 
 
-0.164*** 
 
0.032** 
  
(-3.21) 
 
(1.79) 
∆DERLEV1 
 
-0.332*** 
 
0.050** 
  
(-4.78) 
 
(1.86) 
∆SECLEV1 
 
-0.847*** 
 
0.208*** 
  
(-2.90) 
 
(3.44) 
∆OBSLEV1 
 
-0.834** 
 
0.372*** 
  
(-1.85) 
 
(2.13) 
ASSETCOMP 
 
4.402** 
 
4.175** 
  
(1.88) 
 
(1.78) 
LIABCOMP 
 
2.004*** 
 
2.389*** 
  
(3.21) 
 
(3.98) 
MA  0.002  0.008 
  (0.79)  (0.90) 
INF 
 
0.904* 
 
0.673** 
  
(1.62) 
 
(1.87) 
GDP  0.976**  1.153* 
  (1.86)  (1.58) 
     
     
Observations 
 
413 
 
382 
:  0.148  0.129 
     
F-statistic   11.04  12.88 
p-value  0.00  0.00 
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***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed 
distribution. 
 
 
Table 7b 
Robustness tests. This table presents the second-stage results obtained by 2SLS IV 
fixed-effects regression analysis for the pre-crisis period (2002q1-2007q2) and for 
the crisis period (2007q3-2012q3). The dependent variable is systemic risk (MES). 
The main explanatory variables are the average quarterly changes in: on-balance-
sheet leverage (∆LEV1), derivatives leverage (∆DERLEV1), leverage from 
securitisation (∆SECLEV1), and off-balance-sheet leverage ratio (∆OBSLEV1). All 
explanatory variables are instrumented in the first stage. The instrumental variables 
are given by the two- and three-period lags of ∆LEV1, ∆DERLEV1, ∆SECLEV1, and 
∆OBSLEV1 according to the Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz-
Bayesian Information Criterion. The set of bank-specific control variables employed 
in our analysis includes the asset composition of banks’ balance sheets 
(ASSETCOMP), banks’ liabilities composition (LIABCOMP), and a dummy variable 
which accounts for M&A transactions (MA). Two macroeconomic control variables 
are also used: the level of inflation (INF) and the level of economic growth (GDP). 
A detailed description of each variable can be found in Appendix A. A constant term 
with time (quarterly) dummies is included in the regression models, but is not 
reported in the table. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
    MES 
  Pre-crisis period   Crisis period 
∆LEV1 
 
0.202** 
 
0.243*** 
  
(1.88) 
 
(2.04) 
∆DERLEV1 
 
0.709*** 
 
0.791*** 
  
(3.67) 
 
(3.54) 
∆SECLEV1 
 
0.988** 
 
1.197** 
  
(1.83) 
 
(1.79) 
∆OBSLEV1 
 
0.754*** 
 
0.830*** 
  
(2.64) 
 
(2.27) 
ASSETCOMP 
 
0.489 
 
0.786 
  
(1.44) 
 
(0.63) 
LIABCOMP 
 
0.818 
 
1.178 
  
(0.89) 
 
(0.59) 
MA  0.027  0.039 
  (1.02)  (1.15) 
INF 
 
0.830 
 
0.938* 
  
(1.32) 
 
(1.63) 
GDP  1.794*  1.754* 
  (1.67)  (1.59) 
     
     
Observations 
 
402 
 
361 
:  0.116  0.148 
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F-statistic  9.64  8.18 
p-value  0.00  0.00 
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed 
distribution. 
 
     Tables 7a and 7b summarise the results of the 2SLS IV second-stage regressions, which are 
very similar to those obtained from the baseline regression analysis.23 In particular, all types of 
leverage are found to significantly increase both insolvency risk and systemic risk in the years 
before the outbreak of the crisis (recall here that larger values of ZSCORE are related with lower 
probability of default and, hence, greater bank soundness). In fact, the impa t is stronger for the 
off-balance-sheet banking business. After mid-2007, reverse leverage activity is found to be 
harmful for the entire system, albeit it reduces individual bank risk. As we can further see, the 
deleveraging process that takes place off the balance sheet of banks is more harmful compared to 
the corresponding process that occurs on the balance sheet. To continue, even though the level of 
statistical significance of the estimated coefficients of ASSETCOMP and LIABCOMP on 
TOTRISK are slightly reduced when compared to the results of the main regressions, the signs of 
the coefficients remain largely unchanged. This is to say, traditional activities like the issuance of 
loans and the taking of deposits reduces individual risk and renders banking organisations more 
resilient to shocks. Lastly, no statistically significant relationship is documented between 
ASSETCOMP and LIABCOMP with MES. In summary, the reported results are robust to the use 
of ZSCORE and MES as the dependent variables of the econometric analysis. 
     Since our sample of banks has been selected on the basis of several bank-specific criteria on 
systemic importance, it might suffer from some sort of selection bias. Therefore, a second 
robustness test investigates whether our empirical findings have been influenced by selection 
bias induced by the non-randomness of our sample. To account for this bias, we apply the 
traditional Heckman (1979) two-stage methodology. In the first stage, we construct a dummy, 
which plays the role of the selection variable in the model. This variable is named SCAP and is 
                                                 
23
 The results of the first-stage regressions are not shown here for the sake of brevity, but are available upon request. 
It is important to mention though that the application of the Hansen J-test provides us with p-values which belong to 
the closed interval [0.153, 0.377]. These values mean that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that overidentifying 
restrictions are valid and, hence, we can provide support to the validity of the selected instrumental variables. A 
robust F-statistic test further confirms the validity of our instruments. Furthermore, the Hausman test supports the 
use of 2SLS IV estimation methodology as it was the case in our main regression analysis. 
Page 48 of 82
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 47
equal to unity if bank i has taken part in the SCAP exercise, and zero otherwise. SCAP is linked 
to one of the six criteria we applied to select our sample of banks as analytically discussed in 
Section 3.1.  
     The first-stage (selection) model is a probit model where SCAP is run on ∆LEV1, 
∆DERLEV1, ∆SECLEV1, ∆OBSLEV1, and on a constant term using maximum likelihood 
estimation. The Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) is obtained, which represents the selection control 
variable of the first-stage regression. The IMR is a monotonically decreasing function of the 
probability that an observation is selected into the sample. Moving to the second stage, we 
estimate our baseline model (eq. 11) by OLS incorporating the obtained IMR in the set of 
explanatory variables to correct for possible sample selection bias. In case IMR is not found to be 
statistically significant, then the null hypothesis of no sample selection bias cannot be rejected. 
The first- and second-stage results of the Heckman sample selection model for the two examined 
time periods using SCAP as the selection variable in the first-stage regressions are reported in 
Table 8. 
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     The first-stage results reveal that those banks which participated in the SCAP exercise in 
2009 have been largely involved in on-balance-sheet leverage activities but, especially, in off-
balance-sheet activities. This can be inferred from the positive and statistically significant 
relationships that we document between ∆LEV1, ∆DERLEV1, ∆SECLEV1, and ∆OBSLEV1 with 
SCAP. This sort of relationships remains strong and unaffected for both periods under 
examination. Hence, we can argue that the SCAP banks were highly leveraged before the crisis, 
meaning that, after the outbreak of the crisis, they would be among the first ones to start 
deleveraging their portfolios. If we consider that the SCAP banks are of the biggest banks in the 
U.S. market (size has been the main criterion for a bank to participate in SCAP), then the 
reported results are perfectly in line with the positive relationship that holds between size and 
off-balance-sheet leverage exposure of banking organisations as discussed in Section 3.1. 
     As regards the second-stage regression results, these broadly confirm the findings of our 
baseline empirical analysis. The Inverse Mills Ratio is not statistically significant at the 5% level 
in any of our regressions, indicating that selection problems are marginal in our context. 
Therefore, controlling for potential sample selection bias does not have an impact on our 
empirical findings. Additionally and more importantly, the estimates of the Heckman-type 
regression models are consistent with those obtained from our baseline analysis. 
 
6. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
     In this paper we examined how modern banking that gave birth to the off-balance-sheet 
leverage business affected the risk profile of U.S. banks as well as the level of systemic risk 
before and after the onset of the late 2000s financial crisis. To achieve this, we employed a very 
representative data set of 20 U.S. SIFIs that covered both the pre-crisis period and the period 
after mid-2007 when the crisis erupted. We appropriately modelled the relationship between 
individual bank soundness and systemic fragility with on-balance-sheet leverage variables but, 
most notably, with several complementary measures of off-balance-sheet activities which have 
never been used in the relevant literature. Markedly, we paid special attention to the deleveraging 
process that occurred after the outbreak of the crisis, which comprises an additional innovative 
feature of our study.  
     Our formal evidence reliably indicates that leverage largely contributes to both total bank risk 
and systemic risk thus corroborating the findings that appear in the relevant literature (e.g., see 
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Wu et al, 2011) as well as in the popular press. To put it in a more detailed way, we lend support 
to the view that, before the onset of the crisis, banks accumulated leverage both on and, 
especially, off their balance sheets. Indeed, banks were able to expand leverage in ways that were 
previously impossible: by largely relying on new financial products, they managed to extend the 
short-term funding of their medium- and long-term assets. This increased maturity mismatch and 
raised the probability of bank runs and, in turn, the levels of the overall risk thus forcing the 
system to either fail or consider large-scale bailouts.  
     Accordingly, in the pre-crisis era, the positive relationship that we document between the off-
balance-sheet leverage and risk shows that leverage was one of the main factors responsible for 
the fragility of the banking system. Nevertheless, a much more tangible threat to systemic 
stability was formed after the beginning of the crisis when banks started to dispose the large 
number of bad assets they used to hold either in their portfolios or out of them. The deleveraging 
process, which mostly took place off the balance sheet of banks, is found to be virtuous for 
individual banks’ health, but harmful for the stability of the system.  
     We postulate that the expansion of derivatives trading associated with the increased 
securitisation activity was disregarded by national and supranational regulatory and supervisory 
authorities in the years running up to the crisis. The direct link between off-balance-sheet 
leverage and systemic risk provides the necessary condition to the current debate on stricter bank 
regulations through the imposition of an explicit off-balance-sheet leverage ratio as it is the case 
in Canada for many years now (see Bordeleau et al., 2009). A leverage ratio that does not 
consider off-balance-sheet items encourages banks to either further expand such kind of 
activities, or to innovate other products that can also take place off their balance-sheets. Put 
differently, the failure to incorporate off-balance-sheet items in a measure of leverage exposure 
provides additional incentives to banking firms to shift these items off their balance sheets so as 
to avoid the traditional on-balance-sheet leverage restrictions.  
     We should always bear in mind that traditional capital requirements were one of the chief 
reasons that turned banks to hide part of their assets and, hence, part of their risk off their balance 
sheets. Therefore, two different, complementary leverage ratios need to be imposed in our view: 
one that targets on the on-balance-sheet items and one that aims in restricting implicit leverage 
(both embedded and off-balance-sheet leverage). And, in fact, the new Basel rules (i.e., Basel III) 
are moving towards this direction. 
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     What we also document is that the banks which concentrate on traditional activities typically 
carry less risk compared to those involved with modern financial instruments. To be more 
specific, on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, the replacement of traditional loans with 
tranches of Asset Backed Securities (ABS), Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) and other 
associated derivatives is found to increase total bank risk. Although such tranches are often 
AAA-rated and thus of low risk, the newer assets originated by banks are down-the-quality-
curve. And, in fact, this seems not to have been taken into serious consideration by rating 
agencies before the crisis. Turning to the liability side of the balance sheets, the traditional 
business of taking deposits from households, which has been relatively declined compared to the 
non-interest income business is found to decrease individual bank risk.  
     All things considered, the aforementioned findings could play a role in the current discussion 
about a possible revival of the Glass-Steagall Act, which had banned commercial banks from 
underwriting, holding or dealing in corporate securities, hence essentially separating investment 
from commercial banking activities. 
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Appendix B: Quantile vs. OLS regressions 
The purpose of this Appendix is to explain the main reasons why we use quantile regression 
techniques instead of standard OLS techniques to estimate the return equations (eq. 7, 8, 9, and 
10) in the context of CoVaR measurement. We focus on the following five reasons: 
 
a) In the framework of CoVaR analysis, we can make the assumption that the return equation 
(say eq. 8) has the following linear factor structure: 
 
	|
 =	\ ')	*+\+ ' 	
 \: ' K\= ')	*+\? ' 	
 \tM,	|
           (8a) 
 
where		|
 is the quarterly growth rate of total assets of all N=20 banks that comprise our 
banking system conditional on bank i being financially distressed; 	
  is the quarterly growth rate 
of bank i’s total assets conditional on bank i being distressed; )	*+ is the one-quarter lag vector 
of the state variables that influence bank soundness as described in Section 3.3; and  ,	|
 
u	i	, with u	 ∼ i.i.d. F(0,1), where  u	 is independent of )	*+ , i.e., 9v,	|
 ∣ )	*+	, 	
 w 
0.  
     Both the conditional expected return 9v	|
 ∣ )	*+	, 	
 w  \ ')	*+\+ ' 	
 \:, and 
the conditional volatility 6v	|
 ∣ )	*+	, 	
 w  \= ')	*+\? ' 	
 \t depend on )	*+ 
and 	
 . The coefficients \, \+, 5_	\: can be consistently estimated by running an OLS 
regression of 	|
on	)	*+		and		
 . However, in order the VaR and CoVaR measures to be 
estimated by OLS, we need to also estimate the coefficients \=, \?, and	\t. This implies that we 
need to make a prior distributional assumption about the error term ,	|
 of our model (eq. 
8a). On the other hand, quantile regression analysis incorporates estimates of the conditional 
mean and the conditional volatility, which are needed to produce conditional quantiles without 
having to make any prior distributional assumptions about the error term (see Boyson et al., 
2010; Chan-Lau, 2010; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011; Girardi and Tolga Ergun, 2013; Rubia 
and Sanchis-Marco, 2013). 
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b) Quantile regression models can be estimated for a large range of possible quantiles (see 
Boyson et al., 2010; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011). We can therefore run a set of different 
quantile regressions to estimate eq. 8a for different percentiles.  
 
c) Quantile regression techniques capture the possible non-linearities, which can be found in the 
default risk of some banking institutions as well as in the relationships that hold between the 
default risk of different banks and that of the entire banking system (Chan-Lau, 2010). In this or 
similar contexts, Engle and Manganelli (2004) study a large group of non-linear quantile 
regression models, called Conditional Autoregressive Value-at-Risk (CAViaR). 
 
d) Quantile regression extends the OLS intuition beyond the estimation of the mean of 
conditional distribution of the default risk of a bank, allowing the conditional distribution to be 
sliced at the quantile (percentile) p of interest thus obtaining the corresponding cross-section of 
the conditional distribution (Chan-Lau, 2010).  
 
e) Quantile regression techniques allow for heteroskedasticity (Boyson et al., 2010). 
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Highlights 
 We examine the relevance of on- and off-balance-sheet leverage of banks in the crisis. 
 Attention is paid to the deleveraging process which occurred after the onset of the crisis. 
 Both on- and off-balance-sheet leverage increase individual bank risk and systemic risk.  
 Deleveraging is found to be beneficial for banks’ health, but harmful for the system. 
 Traditional lines of banking business carry less risk compared to modern products. 
*Highlights (for review)
Page 64 of 82
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
Table 1 
Sample of banks. This table reports the 20 U.S. banks which are employed in our empirical analysis.  
Bank name  
1.   BANK OF AMERICA CORP. 11. JP MORGAN CHASE & CO 
2.   BANK OF NY MELLON CORP. 12. KEYCORP 
3.   BB&T CORP. 13. NORTHERN TRUST CORP. 
4.   CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP.  14. PNC FIN. SERVICES GROUP INC. 
5.   CITIGROUP INC. 15. REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP. 
6.   CITY NATIONAL CORP. 16. STATE STREET CORP. 
7.   COMERICA INC. 17. SUNTRUST BANKS INC. 
8.   FIFTH THIRD BANKCORP 
9.   FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP. 
10. HUNTINGTON BANKSHARES INC. 
18. US BANK CORP. 
19. WELLS FARGO & CO 
20. ZIONSBANKCORP. 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Panel unit root test and cointegration test. Panel A reports the values of W-statistic from the panel unit 
root test of Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) and the corresponding p-values. All data series included in the 
return equations (eq. 7, 8, 9 and 10) in the CoVaR measurement are tested for stationarity. The null 
hypothesis under study is that of a unit root against the alternative of stationarity. Panel B summarises 
the results of the Pedroni cointegration test, which examines the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
between the variables of interest. The Pedroni test relies on four statistics: the panel v-statistic, the 
panel PP ρ-statistic, the panel PP t-statistic, and the panel DF t-statistic. These statistics account for 
common time factors and heterogeneity across the sample banking institutions.  
Panel A: Panel Unit root test   
Variables Im-Pesaran-Shin W-statistic p-value 
Growth rate of total assets                    -2.345** (0.031) 
Market return volatility                    -3.519** (0.028) 
Liquidity risk spread                    -1.810 (0.341) 
Yield curve  -3.109*** (0.007) 
Interest rate risk  -2.930*** (0.005) 
Panel B: Cointegration test Pedroni test statistics p-value 
v-statistic 0.184 (0.150) 
ρ-statistic (PP) -1.593* (0.094) 
t-statistic (PP)                      -0.328 (0.139) 
t-statistic (DF)                      -0.540 (0.111) 
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed distribution. 
 
   
Table
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    Table 4 
Descriptive statistics. The summary statistics of all the variables employed in our baseline 
empirical analysis are reported in this table. Panel A shows the statistics for the pre-crisis period 
which extends from 2002q1 to 2007q2, while Panel B refers to the crisis period that commences in 
2007q3 and ends in 2012q3. Variables are distinguished into four main categories: the left-hand 
side risk variables, the leverage variables, the bank-specific control variables, and those variables 
that capture the macroeconomic environment. The description of each variable together with the 
relevant data sources are provided in Appendix A.  
Panel A: Pre-crisis period 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum St. Dev. Obs 
Risk variables 
TOTRISK 2.287 1.212 5.259 0.214 2.221 432 
CoVaR  3.112 2.860 7.194 0.713 1.890 429 
Leverage variables 
LEV1 7.879 7.174 12.121 5.732 0.256 436 
LEV2 0.121 0.118 0.197 0.069 0.021 435 
LEV3  7.123 6.875 10.564 4.784 0.598 436 
DERLEV1 10.989 9.112 17.804 3.731 3.098 419 
DERLEV2 1.865 1.775 3.122 0.484 2.883 427 
DERLEV3  3.167 3.001 5.713 0.965 1.119 426 
SECLEV1 7.005 6.603 11.434 1.740 1.794 431 
SECLEV2 11.995 10.953 21.805 3.842 1.980 432 
OBSLEV1 14.719 13.992 26.141 3.095 2.395 420 
OBSLEV2 9.813 9.175 19.530 1.408 3.592 421 
Traditional banking variables 
ASSETCOMP 0.522 0.513 0.798 0.185 0.178 438 
LIABCOMP 0.223 0.208 0.421 0.063 0.063 439 
        
MA  0.154 0.143 1.000 0.000 0.211 440 
Macroeconomic environment 
INF 0.036 0.034 0.093 -0.035 0.086 439 
GDP  0.026 0.023 0.067 -0.019 1.514 439 
        
Panel B: Crisis period 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum St. Dev. Obs 
Risk variables 
TOTRISK 1.989 1.897 4.342 0.089 1.341 401 
CoVaR 6.959 6.794 10.853 2.805 1.852 392 
 
       
Leverage variables 
LEV1  6.184 5.953 10.909 3.882 0.954 413 
LEV2 0.110 0.107 0.174 0.041 0.017 413 
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LEV3  6.007 5.843 8.904 3.211 0.765 412 
DERLEV1 5.999 5.755 12.004 0.653 4.783 400 
DERLEV2 1.126 1.100 2.275 0.087 3.341 397 
DERLEV3  1.605 1.509 3.009 0.252 3.006 404 
SECLEV1 4.976 4.672 8.843 0.656 2.845 407 
SECLEV2 8.784 8.432 14.734 1.956 2.165 408 
OBSLEV1 9.643 9.462 19.943 1.134 2.742 389 
OBSLEV2 7.683 7.459 15.629 0.747 4.131 392 
Traditional banking variables 
ASSETCOMP 0.652 0.643 1.074 0.099 0.349 416 
LIABCOMP 0.241 0.231 0.382 0.061 0.089 417 
        
MA 0.127 0.119 1.000 0.000 0.087 420 
        
Macroeconomic environment 
INF -0.029 -0.032 0.121 -0.274 3.731 418 
GDP  -0.034 -0.038 0.282 -0.341 4.174 418 
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Table 6a 
Second-stage regression results. This table presents the second-stage results obtained 
by 2SLS IV fixed-effects regression analysis for the pre-crisis period (2002q1-
2007q2) and for the crisis period (2007q3-2012q3). The dependent variable is total 
bank risk (TOTRISK). The main explanatory variables are the average quarterly 
changes in: on-balance-sheet leverage (∆LEV1), derivatives leverage (∆DERLEV1), 
leverage from securitisation (∆SECLEV1), and off-balance-sheet leverage ratio 
(∆OBSLEV1). All explanatory variables are instrumented in the first stage; the 
instrumental variables are: ∆LEV2, ∆LEV3, ∆DERLEV2, ∆DERLEV3, ∆SECLEV2, 
and ∆OBSLEV2. The set of bank-specific control variables used in our analysis 
includes the asset composition of banks’ balance sheets (ASSETCOMP), banks’ 
liabilities composition (LIABCOMP), and a dummy variable which accounts for 
M&A transactions (MA). Two macroeconomic control variables are also used: the 
level of inflation (INF) and the level of economic growth (GDP). A detailed 
description of each variable can be found in Appendix A. A constant term is 
included in the regression model, but is not reported in the table. Heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
    TOTRISK 
  Pre-crisis period   Crisis period 
∆LEV1 
 
0.089*** 
 
-0.009*** 
  
(5.07) 
 
(-2.34) 
∆DERLEV1 
 
1.041*** 
 
-0.784** 
  
(4.75) 
 
(-1.77) 
∆SECLEV1 
 
1.119** 
 
-1.005*** 
  
(1.87) 
 
(-4.21) 
∆OBSLEV1 
 
0.834*** 
 
-0.193*** 
  
(2.52) 
 
(-1.99) 
ASSETCOMP 
 
-4.767*** 
 
-3.163** 
  
(-2.44) 
 
(-1.80) 
LIABCOMP 
 
-1.702** 
 
-0.932** 
  
(-1.79) 
 
(-1.73) 
MA  0.012  0.016 
  (1.21)  (0.98) 
INF 
 
-0.099** 
 
-0.052*** 
  
(-1.76) 
 
(-2.07) 
GDP  -1.165**  -0.865* 
  (-1.86)  (-1.61) 
     
     
Observations 
 
419 
 
389 


 
 0.163  0.179 
     
F-statistic   11.54  10.88 
p-value  0.00  0.00 
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***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed 
distribution. 
 
 
Table 6b 
Second-stage regression results. This table presents the second-stage results obtained 
by 2SLS IV fixed-effects regression analysis for the pre-crisis period (2002q1-
2007q2) and for the crisis period (2007q3-2012q3). The dependent variable is 
systemic risk (CoVaR). The main explanatory variables are the average quarterly 
changes in: on-balance-sheet leverage (∆LEV1), derivatives leverage (∆DERLEV1), 
leverage from securitisation (∆SECLEV1), and off-balance-sheet leverage ratio 
(∆OBSLEV1). All explanatory variables are instrumented in the first stage; the 
instrumental variables are: ∆LEV2, ∆LEV3, ∆DERLEV2, ∆DERLEV3, ∆SECLEV2, 
and ∆OBSLEV2. The set of bank-specific control variables used in our analysis 
includes the asset composition of banks’ balance sheets (ASSETCOMP), banks’ 
liabilities composition (LIABCOMP), and a dummy variable which accounts for 
M&A transactions (MA). Two macroeconomic control variables are also used: the 
level of inflation (INF) and the level of economic growth (GDP). A detailed 
description of each variable can be found in Appendix A. A constant term is 
included in the regression model, but is not reported in the table. Heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
    CoVaR 
  Pre-crisis period   Crisis period 
∆LEV1 
 
0.165*** 
 
0.197** 
  
(2.31) 
 
(1.69) 
∆DERLEV1 
 
0.078*** 
 
0.286*** 
  
(4.31) 
 
(4.24) 
∆SECLEV1 
 
0.552*** 
 
0.669** 
  
(1.99) 
 
(1.75) 
∆OBSLEV1 
 
0.834** 
 
1.275*** 
  
(1.87) 
 
(2.03) 
ASSETCOMP 
 
1.304 
 
0.899 
  
(1.29) 
 
(1.41) 
LIABCOMP 
 
0.868 
 
1.103 
  
(0.99) 
 
(0.90) 
MA  0.028  0.033 
  (1.32)  (1.14) 
INF 
 
-1.106*** 
 
-1.539*** 
  
(-2.46) 
 
(-1.97) 
GDP  -1.883**  -2.376* 
  (-1.89)  (-1.76) 
     
     
Observations 
 
406 
 
375 


 
 0.144  0.129 
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F-statistic   14.12  12.76 
p-value  0.00  0.00 
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed 
distribution. 
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Table 7a 
Robustness tests. This table presents the second-stage results obtained by 2SLS IV 
fixed-effects regression analysis for the pre-crisis period (2002q1-2007q2) and for 
the crisis period (2007q3-2012q3). The dependent variable is bank insolvency risk 
(ZSCORE). The main explanatory variables are the average quarterly changes in: on-
balance-sheet leverage (∆LEV1), derivatives leverage (∆DERLEV1), leverage from 
securitisation (∆SECLEV1), and off-balance-sheet leverage ratio (∆OBSLEV1). All 
explanatory variables are instrumented in the first stage. The instrumental variables 
are given by the two- and three-period lags of ∆LEV1, ∆DERLEV1, ∆SECLEV1, and 
∆OBSLEV1 according to the Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz-
Bayesian Information Criterion. The set of bank-specific control variables employed 
in our analysis includes the asset composition of banks’ balance sheets 
(ASSETCOMP), banks’ liabilities composition (LIABCOMP), and a dummy variable 
which accounts for M&A transactions (MA).Two macroeconomic control variables 
are also used: the level of inflation (INF) and the level of economic growth (GDP). 
A detailed description of each variable can be found in Appendix A. A constant term 
with time (quarterly) dummies is included in the regression models, but is not 
reported in the table. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
    ZSCORE 
  Pre-crisis period   Crisis period 
∆LEV1 
 
-0.164*** 
 
0.032** 
  
(-3.21) 
 
(1.79) 
∆DERLEV1 
 
-0.332*** 
 
0.050** 
  
(-4.78) 
 
(1.86) 
∆SECLEV1 
 
-0.847*** 
 
0.208*** 
  
(-2.90) 
 
(3.44) 
∆OBSLEV1 
 
-0.834** 
 
0.372*** 
  
(-1.85) 
 
(2.13) 
ASSETCOMP 
 
4.402** 
 
4.175** 
  
(1.88) 
 
(1.78) 
LIABCOMP 
 
2.004*** 
 
2.389*** 
  
(3.21) 
 
(3.98) 
MA  0.002  0.008 
  (0.79)  (0.90) 
INF 
 
0.904* 
 
0.673** 
  
(1.62) 
 
(1.87) 
GDP  0.976**  1.153* 
  (1.86)  (1.58) 
     
     
Observations 
 
413 
 
382 


 
 0.148  0.129 
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F-statistic   11.04  12.88 
p-value  0.00  0.00 
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed 
distribution. 
 
 
Table 7b 
Robustness tests. This table presents the second-stage results obtained by 2SLS IV 
fixed-effects regression analysis for the pre-crisis period (2002q1-2007q2) and for 
the crisis period (2007q3-2012q3). The dependent variable is systemic risk (MES). 
The main explanatory variables are the average quarterly changes in: on-balance-
sheet leverage (∆LEV1), derivatives leverage (∆DERLEV1), leverage from 
securitisation (∆SECLEV1), and off-balance-sheet leverage ratio (∆OBSLEV1). All 
explanatory variables are instrumented in the first stage. The instrumental variables 
are given by the two- and three-period lags of ∆LEV1, ∆DERLEV1, ∆SECLEV1, and 
∆OBSLEV1 according to the Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz-
Bayesian Information Criterion. The set of bank-specific control variables employed 
in our analysis includes the asset composition of banks’ balance sheets 
(ASSETCOMP), banks’ liabilities composition (LIABCOMP), and a dummy variable 
which accounts for M&A transactions (MA). Two macroeconomic control variables 
are also used: the level of inflation (INF) and the level of economic growth (GDP). 
A detailed description of each variable can be found in Appendix A. A constant term 
with time (quarterly) dummies is included in the regression models, but is not 
reported in the table. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
    MES 
  Pre-crisis period   Crisis period 
∆LEV1 
 
0.202** 
 
0.243*** 
  
(1.88) 
 
(2.04) 
∆DERLEV1 
 
0.709*** 
 
0.791*** 
  
(3.67) 
 
(3.54) 
∆SECLEV1 
 
0.988** 
 
1.197** 
  
(1.83) 
 
(1.79) 
∆OBSLEV1 
 
0.754*** 
 
0.830*** 
  
(2.64) 
 
(2.27) 
ASSETCOMP 
 
0.489 
 
0.786 
  
(1.44) 
 
(0.63) 
LIABCOMP 
 
0.818 
 
1.178 
  
(0.89) 
 
(0.59) 
MA  0.027  0.039 
  (1.02)  (1.15) 
INF 
 
0.830 
 
0.938* 
  
(1.32) 
 
(1.63) 
GDP  1.794*  1.754* 
  (1.67)  (1.59) 
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Observations 
 
402 
 
361 


 
 0.116  0.148 
     
F-statistic  9.64  8.18 
p-value  0.00  0.00 
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed 
distribution. 
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